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1Introduction 
By  JüRGEN SChEFFRAN AND 
GALE SUMMERFIELD
This issue of Swords and Ploughshares brings together 
papers selected from a series of three workshops on 
sustainable biofuels and human security held at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in May 
and November 2008 and April 2009. The work-
shops were sponsored by the Women and Gender in 
Global Perspectives Program (WGGP), the Program 
in Arms Control, Disarmament and Interna-
tional Security (ACDIS), the Center for Advanced 
BioEnergy Research (CABER), and the Center 
for African Studies, with support from many units 
across campus. Generous support was provided by a 
hewlett International Conference Grant, the Sloan 
Foundation’s Industry Studies Group, the Energy 
Biosciences Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation, the College of Agricultural, 
Consumer and Environmental Sciences (ACES) 
Global Connect Program, and the College of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences (LAS).
Biofuel production has soared in this decade with 
backing from government mandates. Seeking to 
address global warming, promote alternatives to fossil 
fuels, and increase independence in energy produc-
tion, many countries have been striving to become 
key players in the global trade for biofuels as well as 
increase domestic energy production. Food security 
and sustainability issues, however, have clouded the 
future for first-generation biofuels. Second-generation 
production processes, based on cellulosic material 
and algae, are emerging, but they are not yet com-
mercially viable on a large scale. The papers in this 
collection address the social and sustainability dimen-
sions of the biofuel debates, including links between 
biofuels and food price volatility, poverty, and direct 
and indirect changes in land use.
In the first paper, Jürgen Scheffran provides 
an overview of key issues in the bioenergy debate, 
including the demand for biofuels and their impact 
on different dimensions of security—specifically, 
energy security and climate change, land use, food 
and water security, human security, and social 
impacts. he refers to the ongoing efforts to develop 
and incorporate criteria for the sustainable use of 
biofuels into political mandates and the potential for 
technical and economic developments to meet these 
mandates and criteria.
The paper by hans Blaschek discusses the 
changing bioeconomy and brings in the science of 
biofuel production, while stressing the importance of 
multidisciplinary approaches. he discusses current 
bioenergy platforms, the new biology of genomics on 
biomass conversion, and the biorefinery of the future, 
which will produce multiple products. 
Clifford Singer takes both a short-run and a 
long-run view of biofuel policies with respect to fossil 
fuels. he contrasts the policy implications for reduc-
ing petroleum/natural gas and coal consumption, 
stressing that reduction of carbon emissions from coal 
use is the more pressing need and one that requires 
international policy agreements. he then challenges 
the assertion that oil is strategically important to the 
United States, stating that “policy was and is made 
by people conditioned by their historical experience.” 
Singer concludes that the food versus fuel debate in 
the 2020s will be quite different from the present 
one because of changes in technology and the growth 
in demand for food. Quantitative studies of prob-
ability distributions for different outcomes should, he 
argues, inform policy and funding decisions.
Mary Arends-Kuenning discusses the connections 
between biofuels, food prices, and global poverty. 
Using Brazil as an example, she points out the differ-
ences in gains and costs in urban and rural areas. In 
her paper, Arends-Kuenning stresses the importance 
of undertaking more research in agricultural develop-
ment and points to the possibility that moving to 
cellulosic feedstocks for biofuels may reduce some of 
the pressure on food prices.
Anil hira also discusses the links between biofuel 
production and food prices, noting that higher prices 
for poor farmers could be beneficial from a develop-
ment perspective. In his paper, he emphasizes that the 
key motivations behind biofuel policy were the pres-
sures of high petroleum prices and the goal of energy 
independence (as well as concerns about terrorism). 
Although he points out that greater conservation in 
gasoline consumption is part of the solution, he pres-
ents the case that biofuels are the main viable alterna-
tive to petroleum at present. Furthermore, the use of 
sugarcane in Brazil to produce ethanol is currently 
the most efficient production method and should be 
part of the immediate alternative energy scenario.
Timothy Smith, Kristell Miller, and Justin 
Lindenberg address the role that sustainability 
standards can play in the biofuel market. They point 
out that without such standards, biofuel expansion 
is likely to be widely based on feedstocks such as 
2corn (the United States plans to increase production 
significantly by 2022), but that expansion will not 
adequately take into account social concerns. Private 
groups rather than governments are taking the lead in 
developing standards, but already a confusing array 
of different approaches has emerged. This paper helps 
the reader better understand what each standard 
means, as well as the contributions that standards 
can potentially make to the development of biofuels 
that are sustainable and that promote the elements of 
human security identified in this collection.
The paper by Steffen Mueller and Ken Copen-
haver focuses on land use changes and their impor-
tance for sustainability. They question the accuracy of 
remote sensing, a commonly used method for mea-
suring indirect land use changes from biofuel crop 
production, in different regions (Illinois, Brazil) and 
different ecosystems (forest, cropland, and savannah). 
They find that the combined error range may exceed 
the predicted land use change between important 
ecosystem transitions for biofuel analyses such as the 
conversion of tropical rainforest to cropland in Brazil. 
They recommend that regulatory agencies consider 
the limitations of remote sensing in the rulemaking 
process for incorporating land use considerations into 
biofuel production, and they discuss a new approach. 
The final paper in the collection by Gale Summer-
field is a note on China, which is now essentially tied 
with the European Union for the position of third 
largest ethanol producer following the United States 
and Brazil. The food versus fuel debate is much more 
sensitive in China, where economic success is accom-
panied by a growing demand for meat and milk, 
complicated by significant constraints on agricultural 
land and water. Marginal lands in southwest China 
that may soon be used for large-scale biodiesel feed-
stocks are areas in which losses in biodiversity could 
be costly. Today, China is slowly pursuing a biofuel 
agenda and trying to position itself to be a player in 
markets for second- and third-generation biofuels.
This collection of papers presents different views 
of the specialists who participated in the workshops 
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
Some authors are enthusiastic about promoting the 
domestic production and use of biofuels as well as 
the international trade in biofuels. Others are more 
concerned about sustainability, land use, and food 
security. Overall, the contributions explore common 
ground by addressing concerns about and suggesting 
solutions for bioenergy futures that meet criteria of 
sustainability and human security.
3Short Takes
The use of vegetable oils for engine fuels may seem insignificant today, but such 
oils may become in the course of time as important as the petroleum and coal tar 
products of the present time.
—Rudolph Diesel, 1912
The fuel of the future is going to come from fruit like that sumac out by the road, or 
from apples, weeds, sawdust—almost anything. There is fuel in every bit of vegetable 
matter that can be fermented. There’s enough alcohol in one year’s yield of an acre of 
potatoes to drive the machinery necessary to cultivate the fields for a hundred years.
—henry Ford, 1925
[It is a] crime against humanity to divert arable land to the production of crops 
which are then burned for fuel.
—Jean Ziegler, United Nations special rapporteur on the right to food, 27 October 2007
Biofuels have been represented by some as a silver bullet to the climate change threat, 
and by others as a fatal mistake set to destroy forests and increase hunger; they are 
neither.
—Achim Steiner, UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director, UN Environment Programme, in his introduction to the 
2008 report of the German Advisory Council on Global Environmental Change
Biofuels present both opportunities and risks. The outcome would depend on the 
specific context of the country and the policies adopted. Current policies tend to 
favour producers in some developed countries over producers in most developing 
countries. The challenge is to reduce or manage the risks while sharing the 
opportunities more widely.
—Jacques Diouf, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, 7 October 2008
Developing the next generation of biofuels is key to our effort to end our dependence 
on foreign oil and address the climate crisis—while creating millions of new jobs 
that can’t be outsourced.
—Steven Chu, U.S. Secretary of Energy, 5 May 2009
4Articles
 Although the bioenergy 
potential is huge, harvest-
ing biomass is demanding 
because of the comparatively 
low efficiency of photo-
synthesis, requiring large 
areas of land to collect and 
distribute bioenergy.
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the U.S., EU, and Canadian 
biofuel supply and use in 
2006 was about $11 billion 
per year, projected to rise 
to $25 billion per year on 
average by the middle of the 
next decade.
Biofuel Conflicts and Human 
Security: Toward a Sustainable 
Bioenergy Life Cycle and 
Infrastructure
by  JüRGEN SChEFFRAN
The world is facing an important challenge in 
moving toward a sustainable energy system and 
reducing the vulnerability of its energy supplies to 
future disruptions, disasters, and conflicts. Growing 
concerns about energy security have increased the 
demand for domestic renewable energy sources that 
would replace fossil fuels and meet the national and 
international needs for electricity, heating, and fuel 
while reducing the dependence on foreign resources 
(NRDC 2004). Concerns about global warming are 
spurring the search for low-carbon energy alternatives 
to fossil fuels that meet the targets for reductions in 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GhGs) in the Kyoto 
Protocol and follow-on agreements (Worldwatch 
2006).
A significant source of renewable energy is 
biomass, harnessing the energy from the sun and 
fixing it as solid material to serve various energy 
needs. Although the bioenergy potential is huge, 
harvesting biomass is demanding because of the com-
paratively low efficiency of photosynthesis, requiring 
large areas of land to collect and distribute bioen-
ergy. Dedicated crops can contribute to a variety of 
energy uses, including electricity production through 
biomass incineration and refinement into biogas 
and biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel (Rosillo-
Calle and Walter 2006). On the global level, about 
79 percent of all renewable energy is generated from 
biomass, corresponding to 10.4 percent of global 
energy use. By comparison, nuclear power provides 
6.5 percent (Economist 2007). 
Recent years have seen a dramatic shift in policy 
support for biofuels in many parts of the world 
(Scheffran forthcoming). An increasing number of 
countries are promoting biofuel production and use, 
largely through public support rather than reliance 
on market forces. Those countries have set ambitious 
political targets for the substitution of fossil fuels by 
biofuels in the transportation sector, attracting public 
and private investments to stimulate biofuel produc-
tion and use. Besides budgetary support measures 
(direct support or tax concessions), governments 
are widely applying blending or use mandates that 
require biofuels to represent a minimum share or 
quantity in the market of transportation fuels. They 
are also adopting trade restriction measures, such as 
import tariffs, that in some cases protect less cost-
efficient domestic biofuel industries from lower-cost 
foreign competitors. Support to the U.S., EU, and 
Canadian biofuel supply and use in 2006 was about 
$11 billion per year, projected to rise to $25 billion 
per year on average by the middle of the next decade 
(2013–2017) (OECD 2008). 
In 2007 the global production of biofuels 
amounted to 16.4 billion gallons per year, corre-
sponding to 1.8 percent of total global transportation 
fuel consumption in energy terms (OECD 2008). 
Brazil’s share was about 20 percent, the U.S. share 3 
percent, and the European Union’s share less than 2 
percent. Fuel ethanol accounts for most of the world’s 
biofuels, with production of 13.1 billion gallons in 
2007, followed by biodiesel with 2.7 billion gallons. 
Almost half of the ethanol is produced in the United 
States, 38 percent in Brazil, 4.3 percent in the Euro-
pean Union, and 3.7 percent in China.
Currently, corn ethanol is the major renew-
able fuel in the United States. It is now sold across 
the country and is blended in half of the nation’s 
gasoline. Although the vast majority of ethanol is 
blended at 10 percent to gasoline, ethanol blends at 
higher volumes, such as 85 percent (E85), are avail-
able for use in flex-fuel vehicles (FFV), especially in 
Midwestern states. Ethanol production has increased 
from about 1.6 billion gallons in 2000 to 9 billion 
gallons in 2008. In January 2007, the number of 
ethanol plants in operation was 110; by August 2009, 
there were 170 operating biorefineries, with a total 
production capacity of about 13 billion gallons per 
year (RFA 2009). The economic crisis of 2008–2009 
has slowed down the expansion. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2006 established 
concrete targets for renewable fuels and a tax credit 
of $0.51 per gallon (Farrell et al. 2006). According 
to the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA) Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), at least 7.5 
billion gallons of renewable fuel must be blended into 
motor vehicle fuel by 2012, and 36 billion gallons 
of biofuels must be produced by 2022, including 
15 billion gallons of corn ethanol as an upper limit 
and 21 billion gallons of advanced biofuels derived 
5from renewable sources other than corn (RFA 2006). 
Doubling corn ethanol and expanding cellulosic 
ethanol from the current near-zero levels to take a 
leading role in the next decade pose enormous chal-
lenges to the infrastructure needed. According to the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, there are 
significant barriers to producing biofuels at a lower 
cost than petroleum fuels (GAO 2007). Considerable 
investments are required to make biofuel production 
cost competitive with petroleum-based transporta-
tion fuels and overcome the technical and economic 
barriers at all stages of the production and supply 
chain—from crop production, feedstock harvesting, 
transportation, and processing to biofuel distribution 
and use (CRS 2007). 
In addition, the environmental impact of biofuels 
must be addressed, considering material, water, land, 
and energy inputs as well as emissions, and waste 
streams along the entire life cycle. Recent studies and 
media reports have questioned the energy and carbon 
balance of the current generation of corn-based 
ethanol, and have highlighted impacts of the biofuel 
boom on various security dimensions, including 
energy security and climate change, water, and food 
security. Under these conditions, corn ethanol and 
other biofuels have to demonstrate their environmen-
tal sustainability and economic viability. To succeed, 
bioenergy systems will have to become fully competi-
tive with fossil energy and avoid some of the current 
distortions such as subsidies for domestic and import 
barriers on foreign biofuels. 
Security Dimensions of Bioenergy Futures
Although biofuels promise greater security as a 
sustainable energy resource, at the same time they 
induce environmental, social, and economic changes 
that may have security implications. high oil prices 
and the dependence on energy imports from the 
Middle East have increased the demand for alter-
native energy paths that enhance energy security. 
home-grown domestic energy sources offer develop-
ment opportunities for structurally weak rural areas 
and lead to structural changes in land use and agri-
culture (Rosillo-Calle and Walter 2006). As a result, 
support is particularly strong from the agricultural 
community, which expects fast-expanding future 
markets for grain and land resources, creating new 
income and job opportunities for the agricultural 
sector. An economic study of existing ethanol plants 
estimates that a 50 million gallon ethanol plant with 
75 percent local ownership would create 220 new 
jobs (Iowa State University 2006). Extrapolated to 
biodiesel, this plant would result in 1.16 jobs created 
per million liters of annual production. The Renew-
able Fuel Association (RFA 2006) has predicted 
the creation of more than 200,000 new jobs in all 
sectors of the U.S. economy; if realized, this would 
represent an increase in the U.S. gross domestic 
product (GDP) of $200 billion between 2005 and 
2012, and a resulting increase in farmers’ incomes by 
$43 billion. A UN study on the potential of green 
jobs found that renewable energy generates more 
jobs than employment in fossil fuels (UNEP 2008). 
Projected investments of $630 billion by 2030 would 
translate into at least 20 million additional jobs in the 
renewable energy sector.
Advanced bioenergy could possibly help to satisfy 
the growing energy demands of developing countries. 
Worldwide, about 2.4 billion people depend on 
the traditional energy uses of biomass, such as the 
burning of straw, dung, and wood for cooking, light-
ing, water pumping, and other basic needs—uses that 
are often inefficient, unhealthy, and non-sustainable 
(Ezzati and Kammen 2001). It is estimated that more 
than 1.5 million people a year die from the pollu-
tion caused by these open fires. Simple technical 
improvements to stoves can to a large extent prevent 
the health risks posed by biomass use, while at the 
same time doubling or even quadrupling its efficiency 
(WBGU 2009). Because of the high productivity 
of energy crops in tropical and subtropical regions, 
locally produced advanced bioenergy (such as ethanol 
from sugarcane or biodiesel from palm oil) could 
potentially provide income and employment in rural 
areas and in turn facilitate sustainable development in 
these regions (hazell and von Braun 2006). Accord-
ing to the UN Foundation (2006), “Biofuels have 
the potential to alleviate poverty, create sustainable 
rural development opportunities, reduce reliance 
on imported oil, and increase access to modern 
energy services.” In June 2005, the UN Foundation 
launched the Biofuels Initiative aimed at promot-
ing the sustainable production and use of biofuels in 
developing countries. 
To be successful, bioenergy projects need to be 
adapted to the specific regional conditions in devel-
oping countries, which are often best addressed by 
small-scale projects. A recent study explored fifteen 
“start-up” bioenergy projects in twelve countries 
in Latin America, Africa, and Asia where the local 
community benefited from improved energy access 
for both domestic and business use (FAO/PISCES 
2009). Examples are jatropha electrification in Mali, 
a charcoal project in Senegal, palm oil and biogas 
projects in Tanzania, vegetable oil recycling in Peru, 
and biodiesel-based water pumping in Orissa. Such 
projects demonstrate that small-scale bioenergy pro-
duction with improved energy efficiency and better 
use or organic waste material reaps benefits for rural 
communities in poor countries. 
Even though biofuels have a significant develop-
ment potential, they could induce adverse con-
sequences for human security if produced in an 
unsustainable manner. Concepts of human security 
 Corn ethanol is the major 
renewable fuel in the United 
States. It is now sold across 
the country and is blended in 
half of the nation’s gasoline.
 Although biofuels promise 
greater security as a sustain-
able energy resource, at 
the same time they induce 
environmental, social, and 
economic changes that may 
have security implications.
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(UNDP 2007) and focus on “shielding people from 
critical and pervasive threats and empowering them 
to take charge of their lives” (ChS 2003). In the 
biofuel debate, most significant are the implications 
for poverty and food security. A 2007 report by the 
International Crops Research Institute of the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) points out that large-scale 
biofuel production “could provide impetus for a 
corresponding drive to large-scale farming, pushing 
the poor off their land and excluding them from the 
biofuel revolution. It could also lead to the replace-
ment of food crop cultivation with biofuel crops on 
large areas of land, driving up food prices for those 
who can least afford it. The result would be more, 
not less poverty and hunger” (ICRISAT 2007). The 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
predicts that an aggressive biofuel scenario—without 
technological breakthroughs increasing productiv-
ity—could lead to significant price increases for some 
food crops (von Braun and Pachauri 2006). The 
cultivation of energy crops “implies a close coupling 
of the markets for energy and food. As a result, food 
prices will in the future be linked to the dynamics 
of the energy markets” (WBGU 2009). Large-scale 
biofuel production could threaten human security 
and political stability in parts of the world. Competi-
tion from biofuels for land and food crops has already 
contributed to increases in the prices of staple foods, 
such as the sharp rise in the price of corn and tortillas 
in Mexico in 2006 (Runge and Senauer 2007). 
With the economic crisis in 2008, both energy 
and food prices dropped dramatically. In its 2008 
report Economic Assessment of Biofuel Support 
Policies, the OECD suggests that the medium-term 
impacts of current biofuel policies on agricultural 
commodity prices are important, but should not 
be overestimated. Twelve percent of global coarse 
grain production and 14 percent of global vegetable 
oil production could be used for biofuels, up from 
8 percent and 9 percent, respectively, in 2007. 
however, with full implementation of the 2007 
U.S. EISA and the new EU Directive for Renewable 
Energy, these numbers could rise to 20 percent and 
13 percent, respectively (OECD 2008). Many coun-
tries are facing critical questions about their biofuel 
industries, some of which have been discussed in a 
UN report (UN 2007). 
With low-density bioenergy production, land 
use is a critical issue. For example, to replace 10 
percent of its gasoline demand with ethanol, the 
United States would need to devote approximately 15 
percent of its agricultural land area to ethanol-gen-
erating bioenergy crops. With all possible efficiency 
gains (higher yields, more efficient energy conversion, 
lower fuel consumption in cars), federal goals could 
be achieved on one-sixth of the land area than would 
be required without these gains for ethanol produc-
tion, making it possible to produce far more biomass 
on the same land or use less land and achieve an 
equivalent energy output (National Commission on 
Energy Policy 2004). 
And yet intensification of existing production 
systems affects the biological diversity of the land. 
Claiming new agricultural land comes at the expense 
of natural ecosystems (for example, when forest land 
is cleared), which contributes to the current global 
crisis of biological diversity (WBGU 2009). Bioen-
ergy systems based on annual crops on agricultural 
land conflict with the goals of soil protection, while 
perennial crops may help to restore degraded land. If 
the removal of residues from agriculture- or forestry-
based ecosystems is not restricted, the soil may be 
depleted of organic substances and mineral nutrients 
(WBGU 2009). Unsustainable expansion of energy 
crops may also increase the pressure on avail-
able water resources, an issue that requires further 
research. Another key issue is the environmental 
impact from changes in agrichemical uses (espe-
cially nitrogen and phosphorus from fertilizers and 
pesticides) via leaching and surface flow from farms 
to other habitats and aquifers (Goolsby et al. 2000). 
This situation requires a comparison of alternative 
crops or cultivation methods (Boody et al. 2005) 
with projected requirements for crops grown with 
improved or alternate methods (Tilman, Reich, and 
Knops 2006; Donner and Kucharik 2003).
Indirect land use issues have also attracted atten-
tion in the recent public and scientific debates (Far-
gione et al. 2008; Searchinger et al. 2008; Gallagher 
2008). These issues are rising food commodity prices 
and their effects on food security for the poor, the 
displacement of agricultural production onto unculti-
vated areas with impacts on biodiversity, and releases 
of carbon from the soil to the atmosphere. Bioen-
ergy is intended to be climate-neutral because the 
carbon emitted during energy use has been initially 
sequestered by plants from the atmosphere, but in 
the practical implementation additional emissions are 
incurred during the production process. The clearing 
of land for biofuel production releases greenhouse 
gases that contribute to global warming. Emissions 
created by the conversion of ecosystems that contain 
a high proportion of carbon (such as forests and 
wetlands, as well as some natural grasslands) gener-
ally negate the climate change mitigation effects of 
bioenergy and may even exacerbate climate change. It 
has been estimated that the carbon release from land 
clearing can require a payback time of GhG savings 
of several decades up to centuries to compensate for 
the clearing of land for some biofuel pathways (such 
as forest clearing for soya to biodiesel in the United 
States). In other cases, payback time could be less 
than a decade—for example, grassland conversion to 
 To be successful, 
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7palm for biodiesel or sugarcane for bioethanol (Gal-
lagher 2008).
Life Cycle Analysis and the Biofuel Infrastructure
Developing the bioenergy supply chain from sunlight 
to bioproducts requires an integrated approach to 
overcome the barriers and develop biomass-based 
resources into a viable and sustainable alternative 
to petrochemical sources for chemicals and energy. 
Process optimization and integrated life cycle analysis 
(LCA) provides important tools for maximizing the 
benefit-cost ratio and minimizing the adverse impacts 
of bioenergy. Complex issues are raised about the 
production and processing of raw materials, logistics 
and facility location, and the distribution of biofuels 
at the regional, national, and international levels. 
Infrastructure requirements include the growing, 
harvesting, storing and preparing of the feedstocks 
most appropriate to local environmental and eco-
nomic conditions; designing biorefineries, connecting 
multiple biomass materials with multiple bioproducts 
through various conversion processes; transporting 
and distributing feedstocks and bioproducts; and 
overseeing the overall structure of distributed bioen-
ergy networks (Worldwatch 2006). 
Scientific understanding plays an essential role 
in addressing critical questions and providing sound 
input into policymaking. Adverse environmental, 
economic, and social impacts of biofuel growth 
are to be minimized by using life cycle assessment 
as a scientific tool for sustainable biofuel produc-
tion. Existing life cycle models include the GREET 
(Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions and Energy 
use in Transportation) model of Argonne National 
Laboratory (Wang 2004), and the Berkeley Energy 
Resource Groups Biofuel Analysis Meta-Model 
(EBAMM) (Farrell et al. 2006). Previous LCAs of 
biofuels did not include land and water use or eco-
nomic and social factors. 
One measure of the environmental impacts of 
biofuels is the energy balance created by a crop, 
which is the ratio of the energy output from fuel to 
the fossil energy input to produce and use fuel. These 
net values are likely to vary substantially, depending 
on plant selection, growth and harvesting methods, 
as well as transportation and conversion processes. 
In various studies the energy output to input ratio 
for corn ethanol ranges from 0.8:1 to 1.45:1, while 
gasoline achieves 0.8:1 at best (Pimentel 2003; Kim 
and Dale 2004; Sheehan et al. 2004; Brinkman 
et al. 2005; Farrell et al. 2006; hill et al. 2006). 
With advanced production techniques and process 
optimization methods, this energy balance will be 
considerably improved. For cellulosic ethanol, the 
energy output-to-input ratio is expected to rise up to 
around 10. 
Another measure is the level of greenhouse gases 
emitted during the biofuel production and usage 
process. GhG savings vary significantly across 
biofuels. Relative to the fossil fuels displaced by 
biofuels, greenhouse gas emissions are reduced 12 
percent by the production and combustion of ethanol 
over its whole life cycle and 41 percent by biodiesel. 
(hill et al. 2006). Ethanol produced from sugarcane 
may reduce GhG emissions by 80 percent or more 
compared with emissions from fossil fuels. These 
differences can be ascribed to specific attributes such 
as sugar content and fossil fuel inputs (OECD 2008). 
With current policy support, reductions of GhG 
emissions and use of fossil fuels amount to around 
1 percent of the total, making biofuels based on 
current technologies a rather expensive path to energy 
security and mitigation of climate change (around 
US$ 1,000 per metric ton of CO2-equivalent saved) 
(OECD 2008) Biological carbon sequestration can 
make production, deconstruction, and fermenta-
tion processes of biofuels more “carbon negative” 
by removing CO2 from the atmosphere through 
photosynthesis and CO2 storage in biomass, soils, 
and sediments (Post and Kwon 2000).
A comprehensive framework of life cycle systems 
analysis would combine the various components of 
the biofuel life cycle with a set of evaluation criteria 
(Figure 1). It includes five components (feedstocks, 
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Figure 1 Components of the biofuel life cycle, key variables and evaluation criteria. 
8harvesting, processing, distribution, and utilization) 
in a local landscape and incorporates key variables 
and new dimensions (systems dynamics, microeco-
nomic agent-based modeling, GIS-based spatial 
modeling, transportation infrastructure, recycling, 
and waste management). Land use and environ-
mental issues (for example, nitrogen, carbon, energy 
balances) will be addressed by modeling the optimal 
spatial allocation of cropland for feedstock produc-
tion and the mix of feedstocks to meet various criteria 
for biofuel production under various policy scenarios. 
Evaluation criteria include technical feasibility, 
economic viability, environmental sustainability, 
and socioeconomic acceptability. Life cycle analysis 
will help to evaluate the overall impact of process 
improvements on biofuel production, including dra-
matic improvements to biocatalytic rate, productivity, 
and yield to redefine biorefinery performance.
The new generation of biofuels based on cellulosic 
materials, as well as integrated biorefineries that take 
any organic material as an input to produce co-prod-
ucts and electricity, are expected to have much better 
cost effectiveness, energy ratio, water use, and green-
house gas balance. While major progress in these 
areas is expected in the coming decade, the energy 
and carbon efficiency of the current generation of 
biofuels may be improved by short-term intermediate 
solutions during a transition period. Examples are the 
use of nonfossil sources (such as perennial grasses like 
Miscanthus) for energy input into ethanol produc-
tion, or utilizing co-products from corn-ethanol pro-
duction, such as distillers’ dried grains and solubles 
(DDGS) as animal feed. 
Modeling and optimization tools play an impor-
tant role in finding the best bioenergy infrastructure 
in terms of the multiple criteria. This includes the 
design and location of biorefineries and finding the 
best routes in the transportation network, consistent 
with regional feedstock production patterns and the 
location of demand for ethanol (Khanna et al. 2008; 
Scheffran and Bendor 2009; Kang et al. forthcom-
ing). An integrated supply analysis simulates the 
collection, storage, and transportation of biomass 
supply to a biorefinery, taking into consideration the 
trade-off between biorefinery capacity, production 
costs, and transportation distances. Methods of mul-
ticriteria analysis help to rank alternative infrastruc-
ture designs of feedstock logistics and bioprocessing. 
Biofuels become more competitive if co-products 
(such as DDGS in the US Midwest or bagasse in 
Brazil) are optimally utilized. Finding the best mix 
can lead to significant cost reductions for the future 
biorefinery. Integrated models incorporate the best 
selection of the feedstock, farm, biorefinery site, size, 
and technology by utilizing GIS-based decision tools.
The Policy Debate and Sustainability Standards
A comprehensive LCA framework can help to estab-
lish ecological and social sustainability standards. To 
render bioenergy use sustainable, complex regulatory 
measures need to be taken which represent a major 
challenge for a policy-making system (WBGU 2009). 
Concerns about the impacts of growing bioenergy use 
on land use, food production and the environment 
require establishment of bioenergy production and 
consumption in a sustainable manner that mini-
mizes these impacts. In addition, bioenergy systems 
will have to become more market oriented to avoid 
some of the distortions from subsidies and tariffs 
and become fully competitive with fossil energy. By 
producing biofuels in a socially acceptable and fair 
manner, the biofuel industry can bring significant 
income and sustainable development into rural areas 
and local markets (John and Watson 2007).
The demand and political support for biofuels 
have been affected in parts of the world because of 
the growing debate on potential impacts from their 
increased use. The EU has weakened its mandates for 
biofuels and begun to establish conditions and crite-
ria for the sustainable use and certification of biofu-
els. A similar discussion has occurred in the United 
States. In particular, the U.S. Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 states that cellulosic biofuels 
must offer at least a 60 percent life cycle greenhouse 
gas reduction relative to conventional gasoline when 
both direct and indirect emissions are taken into 
account.
A “Biopact” for a North-South trade in biofuels, 
as suggested by Mathews (2007), aims at establish-
ing ecological and social standards instead of trade 
barriers to open fair market access and implement 
sustainability standards for tropical biofuels. Another 
initiative is the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels. 
A comprehensive assessment of the indirect impacts 
of biofuels prepared by Gallagher (2008) represents 
the review by the UK Renewable Fuels Agency. The 
report concludes “that there is a future for a sustain-
able biofuels industry but that feedstock production 
must avoid agricultural land that would otherwise 
be used for food production. . . . The introduc-
tion of biofuels should be significantly slowed until 
adequate controls to address displacement effects are 
implemented and are demonstrated to be effective.” 
According to this report, there is probably sufficient 
land for food, feed, and biofuels. Biofuels production 
must target idle and marginal land and use of wastes 
and residues. Specific incentives are required to stim-
ulate advanced technology, and stronger, enforced 
global policies are needed to prevent deforestation. 
A carbon and sustainability reporting scheme would 
monitor fuel supplier performance and name, praise 
and shame suppliers as appropriate. 
 Bioenergy is intended to 
be climate-neutral because 
the carbon emitted during 
energy use has been initially 
sequestered by plants from 
the atmosphere, but in the 
practical implementation 
additional emissions are 
incurred during the produc-
tion process.
 The new generation of 
biofuels based on cellulosic 
materials, as well as inte-
grated biorefineries that take 
any organic material as an 
input to produce co-products 
and electricity, are expected 
to have much better cost 
effectiveness, energy ratio, 
water use, and greenhouse 
gas balance.
9Searching for common standards requires com-
promises of conflicting viewpoints. An example is 
a report by the National Research Council (2009) 
of which a summary has been published in Science 
(Tilman et al. 2009). Its conclusion:
The search for beneficial biofuels should 
focus on sustainable biomass feedstocks that 
neither compete with food crops nor directly 
or indirectly cause land-clearing and that offer 
advantages in reducing greenhouse-gas emis-
sions. Perennials grown on degraded formerly 
agricultural land, municipal and industrial 
solid waste, crop and forestry residues, and 
double or mixed crops offer great potential. 
The best biofuels make good substitutes for 
fossil energy. A recent analysis suggests that 
more than 500 million tons of such feedstocks 
could be produced annually in the United 
States.
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What are the possibilities for the new bioeconomy? 
This article will try to answer this question by looking 
at the state of current bioenergy platforms, the 
impact of the new biology of genomics on biomass 
conversion, and the biorefinery of the future. here 
a biorefinery is defined as a facility that integrates 
biomass conversion processes and equipment to 
produce fuels, power, and chemicals from biomass. 
The biorefinery concept is analogous to today’s petro-
leum refineries, which produce multiple fuels and 
products from petroleum.
The State of Current Bioenergy Platforms
Any discussion of what the future may hold when it 
comes to the bioeconomy requires an examination 
of where the United States is today in its bioenergy 
platforms. Both dry and wet mill ethanol production 
from cornstarch (U.S.) and ethanol production from 
sugarcane (Brazil) are regarded as essentially mature 
technologies for producing bioethanol. Currently, 
dry-grind ethanol plants produce about 60 percent of 
fuel ethanol in the United States. Because of the food 
versus fuel debate and concerns about the net energy 
balance, ethanol production from corn is expected to 
level off (von Braun 2007). however, some incremen-
tal increases in the energy efficiency of these processes 
can be expected as co-product utilization (such as 
distillers’ grains and bagasse) is incorporated into the 
next generation of plants. Currently, distillers’ grains 
from corn ethanol production is used as animal feed, 
and most of the bagasse from sugarcane production is 
burned for power generation. 
The United States is expected to produce 7 
million metric tons of distillers’ grains by the end of 
2009. Some experts are predicting that the country’s 
production of distillers’ grains and solubles (DDGS) 
will reach 15 million metric tons in a few years. In 
addition to starch, distillers’ grains contain fiber, 
which is composed of cellulose, xylan, and arabinan. 
If these co-products were further hydrolyzed and 
converted into liquid fuels or other bioproducts, 
the efficiency and profitability of bioethanol plants 
would improve even further. Such an improvement, 
however, would require developing technologies for 
the deconstruction and enzyme treatment of the 
fiber component present in DDGS. Members of the 
Midwest Consortium for Biobased Products recently 
completed a comprehensive study on the utilization 
of DDGS that has been published in a special edition 
of Bioresource Technology. Part of this study examined 
the fermentation of DDGS hydrolysates to biobu-
tanol by the solvent-producing clostridia (Ezeji and 
Blaschek 2008). 
Figure 1 outlines the potential steps for the 
pretreatment and conversion of DDGS to simple 5 
and 6 carbon sugars and fermentation to value-added 
products such as acetone, butanol, and ethanol. 
Ethanol production from corn is reaching its 
maximum production levels, and it is anticipated 
that cellulosic ethanol will play a bigger role in 
order to fulfill a target of 30 percent of U.S. gasoline 
demand by 2030. Although most investigators 
suggest that ethanol from corn is slightly net energy 
positive, ethanol production from cellulose results 
in an improved net energy balance and significantly 
fewer greenhouse gas emissions. Work carried out 
at Argonne National Laboratory by May Wu and 
colleagues (2007) suggests that the production of 
higher alcohols such as biobutanol from biomass will 
help to improve the overall picture for greenhouse gas 
(GhG) avoidance (Figure 2).
Butanol as a second-generation liquid fuel offers 
the following significant advantages over ethanol:
•	 It	has	a	higher	energy	content	than	ethanol.
•	 Unlike	ethanol,	it	can	be	stored	under	humid	
conditions—it lacks solubility with water (higher 
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 Because of the food 
versus fuel debate and 
concerns about the net 
energy balance, ethanol 
production from corn in the 
United States is expected to 
level off.
Figure 1 Pretreatment and conversion of DDGS to value-added products. 1 = 
elusieve process (Srinivasan et al. 2005); 2 = electrolyzed water pretreatment 
(Wang, Feng, and Luo 2004); 3 = enzymatic hydrolysis; 4 = ABE fermentation by 
solventogenic clostridia (Ezeji, Qureshi, and Blaschek 2004); 5 = ethanol fermenta-















with reduced fiber, increased 
fat and increased protein 
content
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Ezeji and his colleagues (2007a) have offered an 
overview of recent developments in the genetics and 
downstream processing of biobutanol. The develop-
ment of an integrated system for biobutanol produc-
tion and removal may have a significant impact 
on the commercialization of this process using the 
solvent-producing clostridia.
The challenge on the sugar platform side of the 
conceptual biorefinery will be to scale up tech-
nologies for cell wall deconstruction to the point 
where they become practical on a commercial scale. 
Although it is feasible to produce sugars from ligno-
cellulosic biomass, the concern is related mostly to 
the inhibitors of fermentation (for example, furfurals, 
acetic acid, and coumaric acid) produced during the 
pretreatment process (Ezeji, Qureshi, and Blaschek 
2007b). 
In addition to economics, and specifically the 
price of petroleum, concerns about a sustainable 
environment appear to be driving the push to use 
alternative feedstocks such as corn stover, switchgrass, 
Miscanthus, and tropical maize or sweet sorghum. 
The economics of perennials are particularly favorable 
because Miscanthus is expected to yield 15 tons of 
biomass per acre compared with corn, which has a 
yield of 160 bushels (about 4 tons) per acre. At a level 
of 50 percent removal, corn stover alone is expected 
to provide 90 million tons of fermentable sugars for 
conversion to fuels and chemicals without negatively 
affecting soil fertility. Although some modifications 
may have to be made to the current harvesting equip-
ment, corn stover is readily available, it is largely 
unused, and therefore its production requires little 
additional investment or resources.
Today, biomass provides about 3-4 percent of the 
energy consumed in the United States. It is antici-
pated that biomass could satisfy between 25 and 
50 percent of the world’s demand for energy by the 
middle of the twenty-first century. An examination of 
the bioenergy value chain from sunlight to bioprod-
ucts suggests that a multidisciplinary approach is 
required to overcome limitations to making crop-
based resources a viable alternative to petrochemical-
based systems for chemicals and energy (Figure 3). 
Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this field, 
efforts are under way to develop new bioenergy 
courses and curricula to respond to demand in this 
area (Blaschek et al. 2008). 
Impact of the New Biology of 
Genomics on Biomass Conversion
The current limitations and bottlenecks in the 
production of second-generation biofuels based on 
lignocellulosics include needed improvements in the 
efficiency of bioconversion of plant fibers to value-
added products and more efficient recovery of these 
high-value products (Figure 4). Biological conver-
sion involves the utilization of both 5 and 6 carbon 
sugars by various microbes such as yeast and bacteria. 
Saccharomyces cerevisae is currently being engineered 
to ferment arabinose, Zymomonas mobilis to ferment 
xylose and arabinose, and the solventogenic clostridia 
to saccharify and ferment simultaneously. 
0%
Corn EtOH Corn EtOH:
DGS
DGS or Biomass as process fuels
GHG Avoidance of Biobutanol Compared with 






















Figure 2 Greenhouse gas avoidance by utilization of various feedstocks and produc-
tion of different biofuels. EtOH = ethanol.
















Figure 3 The bioenergy value chain and associated expertise needs.
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 It is anticipated that 
cellulosic ethanol, resulting 
in an improved net energy 
balance and significantly 
fewer greenhouse gas emis-
sions, will play a bigger role 
in order to fulfill a target of 
30 percent of U.S. gasoline 
demand by 2030.
 Concerns about a sustain-
able environment appear to 
be driving the push to use 
alternative feedstocks such 
as corn stover, switchgrass, 
Miscanthus, and tropical 
maize or sweet sorghum.
 Biomass provides about 
3-4 percent of the energy 
consumed in the United 
States today. It could satisfy 
between 25 and 50 percent 
of the world’s demand for 
energy by the middle of the 
twenty-first century.
Because of the need for multidisciplinary expertise 
in this area, the use of plant and microbial genomic-
based approaches leading to translational bioengi-
neering and process scale-up has been compared by 
some observers to the nation’s Apollo Project in the 
1960s. The “New Biology” of genomics allows the 
application and integration of systems biology and 
metabolic engineering of fermentation pathways 
to overcome technical barriers to the production of 
biofuels from lignocellulosic substrates. 
One approach to the development of new plant 
biomass sources calls for examining maize germplasm 
collections for particular cell wall characteristics such 
as lignin content and compositions. Because of their 
recalcitrance, the selection of maize lines with low 
lignin content would be expected to improve fer-
mentation processes. In addition to lignocellulose as 
a potential feedstock, tropical maize or “sugar corn” 
may be a potential 
short-term feedstock 
solution. According to 
work recently carried 
out at the University 
of Illinois, sugar corn 
requires low nitrogen 
input, can be grown 
in temperate climates, 
and contains high 
concentrations of 
sucrose, glucose, and 
fructose. Just like 
sugarcane, the sugars 
in tropical maize can 
be directly fermented 
without pretreatment 
and enzyme treatment, 
which makes this feed-
stock potentially very 
interesting as a near-
term alternative for the 
production of fuels and 
chemicals (http://www.
bioenergy.uiuc.edu). 
The Biorefinery of the Future
The “New Biology” of genomics also allows examina-
tion of gene function and expression, which will, in 
turn, allow development of road maps for construc-
tion of new plant and microbial strains with charac-
teristics tailor-made for the production of a particular 
biorefinery-based product. This technology will result 
in improved economics and efficiencies and direct 
competition of bioproducts for feedstock chemicals 
currently produced by the petrochemical industry.
Some current examples of biorefinery activi-
ties include the investigation by Dupont and BP 
of biobutanol (an advanced 4-carbon biofuel), the 
production of 1,3 propanediol as a polymer platform, 
the construction of a commercial-scale biorefinery to 
produce polylactide polymers, the announcement by 
ADM of pilot-scale testing of corn fiber as a substrate 
for bioproducts, and the commercial-scale production 
of ethanol from wheat straw by Iogen. This is only 
the beginning of the possibilities for the biorefinery 
of the future. It is anticipated that both a sugar-based 
and a syngas-based platform will allow the conversion 
of various feedstocks (including plant materials and 
waste products) to numerous chemicals and fuels. 
The biorefinery of the future is expected to be similar 
in magnitude to and able produce a variety of prod-
ucts quite like today’s mature and vertically integrated 
petrochemical refinery (Figure 5). 
In summary, the future is bright for the biopro-
duction of fuels and chemicals. An overview of the 
biofuel production cycle appears in Figure 6. 












































Figure 5 The biorefinery of the future.
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Much of the recent controversy over biofuels has 
focused on how much their production affects food 
prices and alters atmospheric greenhouse gas concen-
trations. It is quite likely that these issues will have 
to be addressed seriously in the long term as other 
energy sources gradually replace fossil fuels, for it is 
unlikely that electricity can fully replace fluid fuels 
as an energy source for long-distance transportation. 
Also production and use of hydrogen independent 
of biotechnology are not likely to be cost-compet-
itive enough to drive biofuels completely from the 
transportation sector. These observations suggest 
that biofuels may indeed play a significant role in the 
inevitable eventual transition away from fossil-domi-
nated energy supplies.
There is, however, an important difference 
between the issues that need to be addressed in the 
long term and the rationale behind controversial 
mandates for the use of biofuels in the European 
Union and the United States. This article frames these 
rationales into a long-term perspective as a basis for 
examining how durable the near-term government 
mandates for increasing use of biofuels are likely to 
be. The point here is not to critique these mandates, 
but rather to provide a sober appraisal of the various 
factors likely to affect the rate of market penetration 
by biofuels.
The rationales behind the EU and U.S. mandates 
for biofuel use differ in their degrees of emphasis on 
environmental versus national security motivations. 
The European Union has been at least nominally 
focused primarily on the environmental impacts of 
a greater emphasis on biofuels. This focus has given 
the EU somewhat greater flexibility in its biofuel 
mandates—for example, in response to concerns 
about the expansion of palm oil plantations in 
Southeast Asia having a net negative environmen-
tal impact. The U.S. emphasis has been more on 
reducing reliance on imported oil from a security 
perspective, albeit within the context of legislation 
that requires biofuel use to result in some reduction 
in net carbon emissions per unit of energy in the fuels 
produced as compared with gasoline. This emphasis 
could make the U.S. biofuel mandates more respon-
sive to changes in oil prices both because the existing 
legislation allows some administrative flexibility and 
because an extended period of modest fluid fossil fuel 
prices could prompt changes in legislated man-
dates. On both sides of the North Atlantic, political 
pressure to protect the interests of producers in the 
agricultural sectors counters environmental concerns 
and market pressures and establishes a tendency for 
biofuel production levels not to decrease once they 
are established at a given level. 
When it comes to limiting carbon emissions, a 
critical question is how much emphasis should be put 
on limiting the use of coal versus fluid fossil fuels, oil 
and natural gas. When it comes to national security, a 
critical question is whether greater reliance on biofu-
els is a cost-effective approach. 
Carbon Emissions
Concerning the cumulative carbon emissions in this 
century, there is an important distinction between 
fluid fossil fuels and coal: the depletion of more 
inexpensively extracted sources of oil and natural gas 
is likely to significantly increase their cost per unit 
energy compared with that of coal. On the one hand, 
then, carbon emissions from these fluid fossil fuels 
are self-limiting because of the concomitant depletion 
of inexpensively extractable resources. On the other 
hand, near-term reductions in fluid fossil fuel use by 
the EU and United States are unlikely to have much 
impact on the ultimate cumulative global use of these 
fuels.
So far, the world has used about a trillion barrels 
of oil. Exploration and extraction costs for oil typi-
cally range from about $5 to $25 a barrel. (All dollar 
figures here are in terms of year 2008 purchasing 
power.) Thus the global depletion of a trillion barrels 
probably drove the average oil recovery costs up to 
the vicinity of $15 a barrel. Another trillion barrels 
of oil probably can be recovered at up to about 
$30 a barrel, another trillion at up to $45 a barrel, 
and a total of about 6 trillion barrels at up to $90 a 
barrel, a price at which oil so far still appears to be 
economically competitive with other transportation 
energy sources. Burning 6 trillion barrels of oil will 
release about half a trillion metric tons of carbon into 
the atmosphere. A comparable amount of carbon 
emissions is likely to accompany the burning of 
natural gas to the point where use of other energy 
sources becomes competitive with a global natural 
gas market. These are very rough estimates, but they 
suffice to make the point that no matter how much 
the EU and United States attempt to limit their own 
use of fluid fossil fuels, eventual emissions of about a 
trillion metric tons of carbon are likely to be avoid-
able only if there are dramatic technological advances 
that differentially give preference to other energy 
sources over fluid fossil fuels. Near-term mandates 
for the use of biofuels may have some influence on 
the pace of such technological developments, but the 
primary determinant of what becomes possible in 
this century is more likely to be the overall pace of 
development of biotechnology generally.
The situation for coal is very different. On a 
global basis, compared with fluid fossil fuels, the 
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depletion of a trillion metric tons of coal is likely 
to have a much less dramatic impact on the direct 
mining and fuel shipping costs of using more coal. It 
follows that an effective global agreement on limiting 
the use of coal is the linchpin of effective global limits 
on atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. The 
near-term replacement of oil products with biofuels is 
likely to have very little effect and could even distract 
attention and resources from the very challenging 
task of placing effective global limits on coal use.
In April 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency formally began the process of complying with 
a 2007 Supreme Court interpretation of the Clean 
Air Act by declaring carbon dioxide and five other 
greenhouse gases to be pollutants subject to regula-
tion of emissions. Barring a successful court chal-
lenge or a weakening of the underlying legislation, 
limitations on carbon dioxide emissions will follow. 
If limitations result in an across-the-board carbon 
emissions trading system, its impact on the use of 
coal should be much larger than its impact on use of 
fluid fossil fuels. This is because coal arriving at U.S. 
utilities at a cost of $40 per short ton costs about $55 
per metric ton of carbon content, crude oil purchases 
at $40 per barrel cost about $330 per metric ton of 
carbon content, and industrial natural gas purchases 
at $8 per thousand cubic feet cost about $580 per 
metric ton of carbon content (or $290 per metric ton 
if natural gas prices fall by a factor of two below the 
prices typical in late 2008). If the intermediate- to 
long-term elasticities of demand for these three fuels 
are in any way comparable, then the energy sector 
should respond to across-the-board carbon emissions 
limits quite forcefully by limiting coal consumption.
National Security
The historical roots of the rationale for limiting oil 
imports for national security reasons are examined 
in detail in my recent book Energy and International 
War: From Babylon to Baghdad and Beyond (World 
Scientific Publishing, 2008). The information that 
follows on this topic is referenced in that book. 
Briefly, adequacy of oil supplies played a critical 
military role in the final year of World War I and 
throughout World War II. After World War II, hard-
ships during the exceptionally harsh European winter 
of 1946–1947 raised the specter of revolutionary 
chaos, prompting the United States to commit to 
supporting a Western European economic recovery 
complete with secure energy supplies. however, 
sometime between the bombing of hiroshima and 
the end of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, observers 
free of the weight of historical inertia could have real-
ized that the idea that oil was strategically important 
was obsolete. But policy was and is made by people 
conditioned by their historical experience. This point 
is made abundantly clear by the following language 
from the 1979 Revision of the Strategic and Critical 
Minerals Act: “The quantities of materials stockpiled 
under this act should be sufficient to sustain the 
United States for a period of not less than 3 years 
during a national emergency that would necessitate 
total mobilization of the economy of the United 
States for a sustained conventional global war of indefi-
nite duration” (emphasis added).
The Cuban missile crisis made it clear that three 
or more years of sustained conventional war leading 
to loss of access to strategic imports was not plausible 
for the United States in the nuclear age. however, the 
implications of Albert Einstein’s oft-quoted observa-
tion that “the release of atom power has changed 
everything except our way of thinking” had not yet 
sunk in.
The idea that oil imports were strategically 
important economically, harking back to the events 
of 1946–1947 and before, was dubiously reinforced 
by the shortages of gasoline in the United States in 
1973 and the recessions that followed the steep oil 
price increases of 1973 and 1980. With the wisdom 
of hindsight provided by an understanding of the 
origins of the current deep recession, it becomes 
clearer that the principal driver in both cases was an 
overexpansion of the money supply. The increases 
and moderation in oil consumption that accompany 
expansion and contraction, respectively, of the overall 
economy provided and then undermined opportuni-
ties for oil producers to charge high prices. Because 
the petroleum sector has long constituted a modest 
fraction of the total EU and U.S. economies, the oil 
intensity of production has now sunk low enough 
that strong growth in the gross domestic product 
(GDP) could be sustained during the long run-up in 
oil prices from 1988 to 2008. The collapse in finan-
cial liquidity precipitated by U.S. subprime mortgage 
problems was likely to cause a recession irrespective 
of oil prices, which instead went along for the ride.
By 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) was accounting for only 1.8 percent of U.S. 
oil consumption, and fossil fuels were accounting 
for less than 3 percent of the U.S. national defense 
budget. Two U.S. oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico 
were sufficient to produce the amount of oil used 
annually by DOD, at production costs of under $30 
a barrel. The military oil consumption of Japan and 
the United States’ allies in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was presumably even lower. 
Thus adequate evidence is now available to suggest 
that oil imports are neither militarily nor strategi-
cally significant economically for the United States 
and its major allies. Fundamentally, the economies 
of Saudi Arabia, Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and the 
smaller Persian Gulf states are far more dependent on 
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the fluid fossil fuel trade than are those of the major 
importers. Simultaneous disruption of production 
in enough of these states to produce oil price spikes 
far more problematic than those of 1980 and 2008 
are both unlikely to occur over the next decade and 
unlikely to be prevented by higher biofuel consump-
tion in the oil-importing nations.
Nevertheless, the idea that oil imports are 
strategically important is very persistent, especially 
in the United States, as is the idea that stimulating 
consumption of alternative forms of transportation 
energy in the near term is strategically valuable. 
These ideas are born of historical experience. They are 
reinforced by those who have an economic interest in 
biofuel production, by those who have an economic 
interest in trying to maintain a U.S. capability for 
unilateral military intervention in oil-producing 
regions, and by those who have political interest in 
the continuity of such beliefs. As long as the U.S. 
public widely perceives the existence of a substantial 
external threat, the disconnect between the security 
situation and the perception thereof when it comes 
to the strategic importance of oil-producing regions 
is likely to persist. The apparent intractability of the 
struggle in Afghanistan with the Taliban and its sym-
pathetic forces motivated by economic disaffection, 
particularly in Pakistan, is likely to help the broad-
based U.S. perception of a substantial external threat 
persist well into the next decade, even absent another 
major attack on U.S. soil.
In theory, U.S. lawmakers could preferentially 
raise the price of imported oil in order to address 
the perceived security problem of a high frac-
tion of imports. Import tariffs could gradually rise 
until exporters agree to negotiate production levels 
from existing and as yet untapped oil resources in 
a way that stabilizes prices. Exporting and import-
ing governments could share profits in the form of 
royalty and tariff revenues. Oil prices to consumers 
would then rise gradually—for example, at some 
modest multiple of production cost increases. Such 
an arrangement could take much of the risk out 
of fielding systems using alternative transportation 
energy sources, including biofuels. however, a fierce 
lobbying effort, including by the major oil exporters, 
can be expected to defeat any such a proposal in the 
near future. Moreover, even if such an approach were 
politically feasible, political pressures in the United 
States and more reliable profit margins for domestic 
production and possibly for tariff-exempt Canadian 
production would probably hold the average cost of 
oil on the domestic market, at least through the mid-
2020s, to below $60 a barrel (again in terms of year 
2008 purchasing power). Thus, despite the potential 
advantages of such an approach, it is unlikely to be 
adopted or to have a major effect on the near-term 
use of biofuels even if adopted.
Market Penetration by Biofuels: 
A Sober Appraisal
The political imperatives behind increasing biofuel 
use in the United States are thus likely to confront 
a market situation over the next decade in which 
biofuels are substantially more expensive than trans-
portation fuels derived from petroleum, compressed 
natural gas, or both. A tipping point may come at 
about the time the average fraction of ethanol in 
gasoline moves toward exceeding the amount that 
can be used in the existing auto fleet. This limit 
is perhaps a bit but not much larger than the 10 
percent of ethanol currently blended into gasoline 
as an anti-knock additive. What happens at that 
tipping point will depend on a delicate balance of 
market and political forces and so is hard to predict. 
It is clear, however, that the political will behind the 
goal of reaching about 20 percent biofuels in the U.S. 
national transportation fuel mix is likely to be sorely 
tested.
In the European Union, where the push for 
greater use of biofuels is being driven more by 
environmental concerns, that push may be more 
sensitive to reassessment of biofuels’ net environ-
mental benefit. Quasi-independent analysts such 
as academics may play a significant role in shaping 
the debate in the European Union as they critically 
examine the roles that biofuel production and use, 
fluid fossil fuels, and coal play in regional and global 
environments.
The considerations just outlined apply up to the 
beginning of any major run-up in oil prices. It can 
be reliably said that the past does not predict the 
future, but it does give some hints. Oil prices fell 
rapidly after the peak in 1980, and they did not start 
a run-up similar to that in the 1973–1980 period 
until 1998. If the past were to repeat the future in 
a strict temporal sense, then one would not expect 
another major run-up in oil prices until about 2026, 
eighteen years after the 2008 peak. What may or may 
not be more relevant to the spiking phenomenon 
is the rate of cumulative depletion of oil resources, 
which will very likely be faster in the post-2008 
period than it was in the 1980–1998 interval. The 
rate of depletion of the more inexpensively extract-
able oil resources will, however, likely be relevant to 
the base price below which oil prices cannot long 
linger. At current production levels, this base price 
is likely to increase by about $5 a barrel per decade, 
based on the rough estimate just made here of costs 
versus cumulative resource depletion. If prices do 
not rise sharply again for another 10–20 years and 
consumption does not rise sharply before that, then 
the minimum sustainable price is likely to be in the 
range of $25–35 a barrel. Whether the global market 
price actually falls this low just before a subsequent 
steep rise will depend both on the cohesiveness of the 
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often fractious Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) and on whatever intervening 
events cause substantial disruption of oil production.
Should another major run-up in global oil prices 
occur—for example, sometime in the 2020s—the 
impact on biofuel production will likely be substan-
tially different than it was in the 1998–2008 period. 
On the one hand, by then researchers will probably 
have made substantial progress in the technology of 
biofuel production, a research area that tends to build 
on incremental advances in a wide variety of differ-
ent laboratories and production facilities. On the 
other hand, the global consumption of agricultural 
products in the food sector is expected to increase 
substantially by the 2020s, even if global population 
growth continues to decelerate. Even though after 
2008 the run-up in agricultural commodity prices 
that was somewhat aggravated by competition from 
the biofuel sector proved transient, the impact of 
such competition might be more sustained during 
a subsequent surge in global oil prices. Much may 
depend on whether government policies encourage 
the production of biofuel feedstocks on prime agri-
cultural land or manage to steer increased production 
of these feedstocks toward marginal lands.
The picture of the future sketched here is but one 
of a number of possible outcomes, some more likely 
than others. The formulation of public policy and 
funding priorities in the biofuel area thus needs to be 
well informed by a quantitative study of probability 
distributions for various outcomes. The lessons of the 
past should not be overly relied upon for guidance 
about the future, but neither should they be ignored.
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In the first half of 2008, as food prices spiked and 
the media were filled of reports of food riots in 
countries such as haiti, organizations devoted to 
poverty alleviation blamed the situation on govern-
ment biofuel policies in the United States and the 
European Union. From July 2007 to July 2008, rice 
prices increased by 150 percent, corn prices by 100 
percent, and soybean prices by about 75 percent 
(World Bank Commodity Price Data). On the one 
hand, some critics argued that the demand for corn 
to manufacture ethanol in the United States was 
diverting corn from the food chain and causing prices 
to rise. On the other hand, advocates of biofuels 
argued that other factors were to blame for the rise 
in food prices and that biofuel production had great 
potential to pull many of the world’s rural-based poor 
out of poverty. As the significant price drops in fall 
2008 demonstrate, the reality is complex and varies 
across countries and regions. In this article I present 
data from Brazil to illustrate concepts and specific 
examples of such reality.
The Effects of Food and Fuel Prices on the Poor
Media coverage of how changes in food prices affect 
poor people in developing countries neglects the 
crucial fact that the impacts depend on whether 
one is discussing the rural poor or the urban poor. 
households that are net consumers of food—that 
is, almost all of the urban population—are unam-
biguously harmed by increases in food prices. And 
the poorer the household, the more negative is 
the impact. According to Engel’s law, which holds 
across countries and within countries, as households 
become wealthier they spend a smaller percentage of 
their income on food. Because food is what econo-
mists call a necessity, the elasticity of demand for 
food is between 0 and 1. For example, Americans 
spend about $0.15 of each additional dollar on food. 
A recent study of the poor in thirteen developing 
countries found that they spend between $0.54 and 
$0.74 of each additional dollar on food (Bannerjee 
and Duflo 2007). In addition, poor people consume 
less processed food than do wealthy people, and so 
poor people are directly affected by increases in the 
prices of staples such as corn. When the prices of 
most commodities are increasing, the ability of the 
poor to find less expensive substitutes for rice or corn 
is limited, whereas for a processed food only a small 
proportion of the price of the food might be affected 
by the price of the staples used to make it. 
high food prices can, however, benefit the rural 
poor. The media do not cover in as great a depth the 
positive impact of high prices on developing country 
farmers, who can then sell their production at the 
higher prices. The rural poor consist of those who 
own small amounts of land and those who are land-
less. The extent to which poor small farmers benefit 
from high food prices depends on the economies of 
scale in production and on access to food markets. 
Many poor farmers in countries such as those in 
sub-Saharan Africa lack access to markets, which 
limits their ability to respond to higher food prices. 
Crops that have large efficiencies of scale, such as 
sugarcane in Brazil, have less potential to improve 
the lives of small farmers than do crops that do not 
have such efficiencies. The landless poor earn most of 
their income from their labor. Therefore, for the rural 
landless to benefit from high food prices, farmers 
must increase their demand for labor, which drives up 
wages for poor laborers. higher food prices also have 
indirect effects on the rural poor. higher incomes 
in rural areas have multiplier effects when farmers 
spend their money on rural goods and services. The 
producers of these goods and services employ the 
rural poor. As for the poorest of the poor in rural 
areas, many cannot grow enough food to meet their 
families’ needs and are net consumers. They may gain 
from price increases as producers, but they are hurt 
by them as consumers.
Although the urban and rural poor are affected 
differently by increases in food prices, both groups 
benefit from lower fuel prices. Therefore, to the 
extent that biofuels lower fuel prices, the poor will 
benefit. however, fuel prices account for a lower 
share of poor people’s consumption than food. For 
example, in Brazil the 20 percent of the households 
with the lowest income devote 35 percent of their 
total expenditures to food and only 8 percent to 
transportation. The richest 10 percent of households 
devote 10 percent of their expenditures to food and 
17 percent to transportation.
Poverty Rates
Globally, poverty rates tend to be higher in rural areas 
than in urban areas. As countries become wealthier, 
people migrate out of rural areas to urban areas. 
however, in Latin America poverty is becoming pri-
marily an urban problem as the population becomes 
highly urbanized. In Brazil, the second largest 
producer of ethanol in the world, less than 20 percent 
of the population lives in rural areas. By contrast, in 
sub-Saharan Africa the population is primarily rural, 
with over 75 percent of the population of the poorest 
countries living in rural areas. 
In both rural and urban areas, poverty rates are 
set by comparing household income to a poverty 
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line, defined as the minimum income that a govern-
ment or other policymaker decides is necessary for 
households to achieve a minimum standard of living. 
For the rural agricultural population, high food prices 
affect income as well as the cost of living. For the 
urban population, income is not affected by food 
prices, but the cost of living is. how poverty lines are 
defined differs across countries and across institu-
tions, but most are defined so that they depend on 
food costs. For example, in Brazil one poverty line 
commonly in use is based on the cost of a typical diet 
that meets the minimum nutritional requirements 
of the household. The poverty line is set as equal to 
the cost of the diet plus extra income to meet the 
minimum basic needs of shelter and clothing. Specifi-
cally, researchers look at a country’s household con-
sumption data, determine the cost of the diet based 
on what households consume, and then see how 
households with income equal to the cost of that diet 
spend their income. The poverty line is then adjusted 
to take into account the percentage of income that 
a household with just enough money to afford the 
basic diet decides to spend on other goods.
Biofuel Policies and the Poor
To determine how government biofuel policies in 
developed countries affect the poor in developing 
countries, analysts should first examine the extent 
to which biofuel policies affect global food prices. 
Then, they should adjust national poverty lines to 
account for changes in the cost of living brought 
about by higher global food prices and compare the 
adjusted poverty lines with household incomes. For 
those persons whose incomes are positively affected 
by higher food prices, analysts should adjust those 
incomes and compare them with the adjusted poverty 
lines.
Researchers agree that the rise in food prices 
experienced between early 2007 and the summer of 
2008 had many causes. The source of the controversy 
is the magnitude of the effects of the various causes. 
In addition to biofuel policy, on the demand side the 
factors include a rising world population, rapid eco-
nomic growth in China and India, increases in specu-
lation, and a weaker U.S. dollar. Economic growth in 
developing countries leads to rising demand for meat, 
milk, and eggs—foods that require grain as livestock 
feed. On the supply side, rising oil prices, slowing 
growth in agricultural production, and poor weather 
in Australia, Russia, Ukraine, and South Africa were 
factors in higher food prices. Once food prices began 
to rise, developing countries enacted policies such 
as export taxes and export bans that led to further 
increases in food prices (Trostle 2008; Lustig 2008; 
Mitchell 2008).
Currently, researchers are debating the extent to 
which government biofuel policies were responsible 
for the run-up in world food prices that peaked in 
the summer of 2008. In the academic literature, the 
question is not yet settled because the peer review 
process takes time. Most of the studies available do 
acknowledge that biofuels played a role, but they 
do not attempt to determine the magnitude of the 
impacts of the various factors. Of those few studies 
that do so, estimates of the extent to which biofuel 
prices caused the increase in global food prices range 
from 75 percent, according to a World Bank report 
(Mitchell 2008), to 12 percent, according to a report 
by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(Baier et al. 2009).
In world agricultural markets, the biofuel 
producers and food exporters large enough to affect 
world prices are Brazil, the United States, and the 
European Union. Most researchers agree that Brazil 
is an efficient producer of ethanol using sugarcane. 
Sugarcane production in Brazil yields 710 gallons 
of biofuel per acre, compared with 403 gallons per 
acre from corn in the United States (Trostle 2008). 
Brazil has not converted much land from the produc-
tion of food grains to the production of biofuels, 
so Brazil’s biofuel policy has not affected food grain 
prices significantly. however, Brazil’s biofuel policy 
has increased the world price of sugar by 12 percent, 
according to the Board of Governors study. Of all 
biofuel policies worldwide, the U.S. and EU policies 
are the most controversial and potentially have the 
largest impact on global food prices.
International organizations disagree with the U.S. 
and EU governments about the role of U.S. and EU 
policies in global food crises. In the summer and 
fall of 2008, the World Bank, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Center for 
Global Development, and International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) came out with reports that 
emphasized the role of biofuel policy in rising global 
food prices. The World Bank, which attributed 75 
percent of food price increases to biofuels, based its 
high estimate on the speculation in grain markets and 
restrictive developing country policies that stemmed 
from biofuels. Lustig (2008) of the Center for Global 
Development argues that the timing of the accelera-
tion in world prices that began in 2006 coincided 
only with changes in ethanol policy in the United 
States and biodiesel policy in Europe and not with 
discrete changes in other factors. 
U.S. government agencies and U.S.-based 
researchers who conclude that biofuel policy had a 
small impact on world food prices argue that other 
researchers are confusing correlation with causa-
tion. They note that the price of grains makes up a 
small portion of the total price of processed foods. 
In the United States and EU, the primary impact on 
consumers has been through dairy and meat prices. 
however, the poorer the household, the higher is the 
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share of the diet from grains. In Brazil, the poorest 
income group consumes per capita per year 32 kilo-
grams of rice, 15 kilograms of beans, 12 kilograms of 
beef, and 10 kilograms of chicken. By contrast, the 
richest income group consumes per capita per year 23 
kilograms of rice, 10 kilograms of beans, 20 kilo-
grams of beef, and 14 kilograms of chicken (Schlind-
wein and Kassouf 2007). 
When building models of the world grain 
markets, researchers make assumptions that are 
crucial to their results. The Federal Reserve study 
(Baier et al. 2009) includes a spreadsheet in which 
readers can plug in their own assumptions for differ-
ent countries. The authors conclude that to generate 
numbers like those produced by the World Bank 
(Mitchell 2008), one would have to assume that 
grain supply and grain demand are very unresponsive 
to changes in price and that farmers readily switch 
acreage from grains such as wheat and rice to biofuel 
crops such as soybean and corn. They argue that these 
assumptions are contradictory, because indirect effects 
are large when farmers can easily switch supply from 
one crop to another, which is behavior incompatible 
with an unresponsive grain supply.
There is a consensus among the research cited here 
that U.S. biofuel policy has increased the price of 
corn, with even the low estimates indicating increases 
of 20 percent. The controversy surrounds the mag-
nitude of effects and the extent to which increases in 
corn prices affected the prices of other commodities. 
When corn prices increase, farmers switch from pro-
ducing soybeans to producing corn. Also, demand for 
other grains such as wheat might increase as consum-
ers switch from eating corn tortillas to wheat bread. 
What does the research indicate about increases 
in poverty rates stemming from high food prices? 
heady and Fan (2008) discuss recent studies that 
use simulation techniques to investigate the impacts 
of large increases in food prices on poverty rates in 
developing countries. One World Bank study found 
that because many of the rural poor in sub-Saharan 
Africa consume more food than they produce, rural 
poverty rates would increase more than urban poverty 
rates in two out of three African countries (Ivanic 
and Martin 2008). Another study by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (Zezza et al. 2008) indi-
cated that the most vulnerable households are urban 
or rural landless, less educated, larger, and without 
access to infrastructure. An Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank study indicated that Brazil’s poverty rate 
rose from 28.3 percent to 31.5 percent as a result 
of a 68 percent increase in global grain prices. This 
study assumed that consumers did not change their 
consumption patterns in response to price increases, 
which indicates an overestimate of the impacts. 
Summary
The impact of government biofuel policy on poverty 
in developing countries varies across regions within 
countries and across household types. To the extent 
that biofuels compete with food, urban consumers 
lose out. Poor rural producers might benefit to the 
extent that they are able to take advantage of higher 
food prices and to be competitive producing biofuel 
feedstock. Even the poor in rural areas who are not 
net producers of food themselves might benefit if 
the demand for their labor increases. This article 
has focused on current biofuel technologies, which 
use corn, soybean, and sugarcane as feedstock. If 
scientists are able to make cellulosic ethanol economi-
cally viable, the impact of biofuels on food prices will 
probably lessen. 
Whether or not biofuel production was primarily 
responsible for the dramatic increases in food prices 
from 2007 to 2008, greater investment in agricul-
tural research and infrastructure presents a win-win 
situation. high food prices affect consumers and 
farmers differently, but both groups would gain from 
increased agricultural productivity. Farmers would 
be able to produce more food with the same inputs, 
thereby raising their incomes. Consumers would 
benefit from lower food prices as the supply of food 
increases. Since the 1980s, the amount of foreign aid 
spent on agriculture has fallen. The innovations in 
plant breeding that brought about the Green Revolu-
tion have bypassed much of sub-Saharan Africa, and 
the returns on research there are likely to be high. 
Investments in infrastructure such as roads enable 
small farmers to be able to get their production to 
market.  
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Over the last year, alarm bells have gone off about 
rising food prices, and many articles and reports 
have cited biofuel production as a leading cause. 
Time called its cover story on the issue “The Clean 
Energy Scam” (March 27, 2008), and the Economist 
has carried several articles, including one titled “The 
Silent Tsunami: Food Prices Are Causing Misery 
and Strife Around the World” (April 17, 2008). 
Both articles pointed the finger squarely at biofuel 
subsidies and protection as one of the major causes of 
the soaring prices. The resulting pressure for remedial 
measures led to retrenchment of plans to increase 
biofuel production in parts of Europe, including the 
UK, and growing calls throughout the world to scale 
down or eliminate biofuel production.
As in any policy debate of the public’s interests, 
academics play an important but often not well-
publicized role. Academic research, including a 
conference I attended at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign in November 2008, has revealed 
that commentators on biofuel production should be 
much more careful before passing any judgment on 
biofuels. This became obvious when the economic 
crisis in fall 2008 induced a sharp decline in both oil 
and food prices while biofuel production continued 
to rise. Various short- and long-term factors have to 
be considered, but the overall picture is not mysteri-
ous. Thus the inaccurate portrayal of biofuels in the 
media is all the more consternating.
An Overview
The push for biofuels has stemmed from the spec-
tacular rise in petroleum prices, which has jeopar-
dized the world economy, people’s way of life, and 
the chance of any rapid rise in the standard of living. 
Another factor is that in an age of terrorism the 
United States and Europe are tired of dealing with 
the security mess in the oil-producing states in the 
Middle East. North Americans have recognized that 
their own expenditures on gasoline are indirectly 
funding attacks against them. Clearly, they need to 
find solutions to reduce this dependence.
During the recent U.S. presidential campaign, 
it was suggested that Americans could drill their 
way out of their dependence on foreign oil. This 
approach, however, will not make much of a dent in 
the problem. Most estimates suggest that new drilling 
would contribute only marginally to the U.S. energy 
supply, and it would be undertaken in some cases at 
a high environmental risk. Moreover, whatever North 
Americans do domestically will not affect the overall 
price of petroleum, which is based on world market 
prices. Many analysts have pointed out that it is not 
just North Americans’ own profligate consumption, 
but also the heightened appetites of India and China 
in line with their spectacular economic growth over 
the last decade that have led to increases in fuel 
prices. World demand, by all accounts, is expected 
to continue to increase, not decrease. And at the 
moment, the prospects of discovering huge new and 
readily accessible (that is, economical) sources of 
petroleum do not seem great. Indeed, most analysts 
cannot fathom a scenario in which new supplies 
could possibly keep up with the growth in demand. 
This situation is inciting companies and countries to 
take part in increasingly unsavoury deals with corrupt 
and dangerous states, leading to kidnappings in 
Nigeria and the Sudan and piracy in Somalia, among 
other things. Oil revenues are thus fueling conflict 
more than improving prospects for development in 
much of the world.
The most obvious and (theoretically) attrac-
tive way out of this mess is to find ways to reduce 
consumption. There is no question but that mass 
transportation systems in much of North America are 
underfunded and poorly supported. Improvements in 
economic signals such as raising gas taxes and setting 
a carbon tax to reflect true environmental costs have 
hit major political roadblocks. Although politicians 
talk eloquently about the possibilities of a “green jobs 
revolution,” they are considerably more reluctant 
to state how such a revolution would be funded or 
touch on the more obvious and less costly solution 
of changing the way people do things. It simply does 
not seem to be in North Americans’ cultural DNA 
to think about reducing consumption, in spite of the 
huge abyss between the haves and have-nots and the 
growing environmental problems their way of life is 
causing. Thus what seems to be a simple part of the 
solution is really a very long-term campaign that will 
require a combination of crises, leadership, and social 
awareness and movements, possibly over generations.
But what about the short and medium term? 
Some critics of biofuels point to ready alternatives 
that are renewable and therefore preferred. In the 
long run, they may be proven right, but just now 
such claims simply do not jibe with where North 
America is technologically. The first main hurdle is 
to develop an economical energy storage capability. 
At the moment, energy is generally produced when 
it is needed—a use or lose situation. The integration 
of energy systems has to a limited extent improved 
the ability to use imports and exports so that energy 
capacity is not wasted. however, transmitting energy 
over distance is also a costly enterprise, and thus 
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there are serious limits to how much can be gained 
in this manner. The most obvious renewable source, 
hydroelectricity, is rarely mentioned by energy critics. 
hydro, such as the Three Gorges Dam in China, 
has a black eye from the environmental destruction 
and displacement of local peoples and habitats it has 
wrought. It also requires heavy state investments, 
because so far only large-scale plants have proven 
to be generally economically efficient, which is 
something few states are able to pull off in this era of 
financial stringency. Finally, only a limited number 
of sites possess the conditions suitable for new hydro 
operations. Still, countries such as Brazil and Canada 
could expand their hydropower, and so this option 
should be more seriously considered. More research 
is needed into how to reduce the costs of hydro-
power development and thus overcome the political 
resistance to what is the most proven and cleanest 
renewable technology.
Some renewable sources, particularly wind power, 
are developing rapidly in terms of their technology 
and cost-effectiveness. however, wind power has its 
own drawbacks. Because it depends on air currents, 
it is either intermittent or limited to certain loca-
tions, it can affect bird migratory patterns, and often 
locals are resistant to having large wind farms on their 
landscapes. Therefore, wind can make a limited but 
important contribution to the emerging energy mix.
Solar power is much more expensive to install and 
therefore less economically viable in the immediate 
term. Countries such as Germany have been very 
proactive in promoting solar power, and perhaps in 
several decades a technological breakthrough that 
brings down its costs will enable its spread. Other 
technologies, such as tidal and geothermal, are far 
more limited, both in terms of their level of technol-
ogy and in terms of their contribution in the future.
The Role of Biofuels
Thus the conundrum remains: what can be done in 
a petroleum-dependent system, where the lubricant 
of the economy, from agriculture to transportation 
to industry and from moving to heating to plastics, is 
becoming increasingly expensive and in short supply. 
Can biofuels play an immediate role? Under particu-
lar conditions, they certainly can.
The first issue to tackle is food prices. Because 
farmers are the poorest and hungriest citizens of the 
world, higher food prices are not necessarily a bad 
thing. however, much of the world’s agriculture is 
subsidized to the hilt by the Northern states—the 
United States, Europe, and Japan—thereby elimi-
nating the possibility that farmers in the South can 
compete on any fair basis. Also, serious costs are 
associated with the petroleum inputs to agriculture, 
from fertilizer to tractors to transporting foods to 
markets, and so obviously biofuel production has had 
only a partial effect on food prices. Thus more care 
should be given to claiming that higher food prices 
are always a bad thing. There are too many examples 
of precipitous drops in commodity prices driving 
farmers in the developing world out of business and 
into poverty to support such a notion.
The second issue is that not all biofuels are alike. 
Because biofuels are tied to agriculture, its malignant 
subsidies, and the desire to reduce the ravages of the 
petroleum-based economy, they have been viewed in 
good part through a national security and domes-
tic politics lens. Therefore, strong protectionism is 
preventing the development of a viable global biofuel 
market, and each state is focusing on promoting bio-
fuels based on the products it produces. Thus Europe 
strongly promotes rapeseed oil and the United 
States and Canada corn. Corn prices, in particular, 
have gone up, and the net effect has been to reduce 
support for ethanol production in North America. 
Corn is used in many different ways in the food 
chain, from direct use to feeding livestock to produc-
ing corn syrup. There have also been questions about 
the net carbon effects of biofuel crops in view of the 
heavy subsidies and protection such crops enjoy. 
The overall efficiency of biofuel production 
depends on two factors: (1) the net energy benefit of 
the crop itself and (2) the trade-offs for producing 
that energy in other forms—in other words, the price 
of petroleum. In terms of the first factor, sugarcane is 
by far the most efficient crop for producing biofuel. 
Common estimates are that it is eight times more 
efficient than corn (which is, in turn, more efficient 
than rapeseed oil). Thus creating a global biofuel 
market based on sugarcane fuel would clearly be the 
best way to begin to reduce petroleum dependence. 
The second factor comes into play because the price 
of petroleum, though on a long-term upward trajec-
tory, is, like that of any other commodity, quite vola-
tile. The breakeven price for sugarcane-based ethanol 
is often placed at about $70 a barrel of oil. Because 
the price of oil was well above $100 a barrel for much 
of 2008, it seems sugarcane-based fuel is certainly 
economically viable. Therefore, returning to an earlier 
point, because people spend money on food, trans-
port, industry, and heating, doesn’t it make sense to 
calculate rationally the cheapest way to produce such 
goods and services? If so, sugarcane-based biofuels 
have to be part of the mix.
There are, however, important caveats. Not all 
sugarcane production is equally efficient. Brazil is one 
of the cheapest producers in the world because it has 
an extensive system of natural irrigation. Therefore, 
it makes sense to promote Brazil as a major producer 
of ethanol for the world, and it still has large capacity 
for expansion. Other countries in the tropical belt, 
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typically the most impoverished parts of the world, 
could also become exporters, thereby increasing their 
export revenues and their standards of living. But 
many steps must be taken before that can happen. 
There are major obstacles to biofuel trading, some of 
which were discussed earlier. A huge overhaul and 
investment are also required in transporting the fuel 
and refurbishing the entire production chain for 
ethanol, down to retail gas stations. There is also the 
question of renovating the vehicle fleet in most coun-
tries. A normal car engine can accommodate a 10 
percent ethanol mix without damage, but the current 
flex-fuel vehicles produced in Brazil can accommo-
date a much wider range of mixes, thereby allowing 
flexibility in markets, depending on the price of 
ethanol relative to that of petrol. Flex-fuel vehicles 
could be produced around the world, reigniting the 
auto industry along with development of hybrids and 
electric cars.
The record of biofuel producers also needs 
refurbishing. In countries such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia, large palm oil plantations have created 
severe environmental damage. In Brazil, destruction 
of the Amazon is not an issue because most sugarcane 
production is concentrated around the state of São 
Paulo. Moreover, Brazil has improved the efficiency 
of its process over time by learning how to burn 
the stalks and waste for cogeneration of electricity. 
however, important adjustments must be made in 
terms of the high social costs to Brazilian sugarcane 
producers, who often work under quite difficult cir-
cumstances. These adjustments can be made without 
losing the promise of biofuels, which can play a 
vital role in the transition to a reduced-petroleum 
economy.
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Concerns about energy supply, national security, 
climate change, and economic development have 
dominated domestic and transnational dialogues in 
recent years. Long-term demand pressures on energy 
from the developed and developing world, political 
instability in many oil-exporting countries, immense 
variability in the price of oil, and negative effects on 
local and global environments are adding significant 
fuel to the fossil fuels fire. It is at the center of these 
challenges where many countries see biofuels as a 
viable answer. Regardless of country or region, biofuel 
advocates are promising improved energy security 
and greater economic development opportunities for 
rural communities based on an increased supply of 
“green home-grown” energy. Particularly for develop-
ing countries, biofuels are viewed as important new 
export opportunities and a means of reducing import 
bills for energy-deficient countries in the global 
South. Therefore, biofuels will likely be a key part of 
an international response targeting improved energy 
diversification and new viable clean energy sources. 
however, those choosing among the host of strategies 
available to achieve these outcomes often face the 
competing social, economic, environmental, com-
mercial, and political factors at work both between 
and among international actors.
Although much attention has been paid to the 
environmental and social aspects of biofuels, cur-
rently little agreement exists on sustainable produc-
tion levels, sources of this production, and under 
what conditions this production could be supplied. 
Much research has focused on “well-to-wheel” analy-
ses of biofuels, exploring issues of feedstock availabil-
ity and composition, production technologies, facility 
energy sourcing, and tailpipe emissions (Farrell et al. 
2006; Woods and Bauen 2003; Worldwatch Institute 
2006), but the vast majority of this work has been 
directed toward issues of carbon intensity. Only 
very recently have the analyses begun to systemati-
cally address impacts to water, soil quality, human 
health, and ecosystem services (hill et al. 2009; Lal 
2009; Van Der Velde et al. 2009). In the absence 
of controversial indirect land use effects, biofuels—
including even the least efficient cornstarch-based 
ethanol forms—are widely thought to be more 
favorable than petroleum fuels in terms of net energy 
balance and carbon-intensity. however, if scientists 
have learned anything over the last few years during 
which the public has been hopping on and off of 
the biofuel bandwagon, it is that not all biofuels are 
created equal. A perfectly well-intentioned purchase 
of biodiesel may not provide the expected reductions 
in greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions if the palm oil 
plantation supplying the feedstock for this fuel is 
located in what was a tropical peatland rainforest 
that has been drained, cleared, and burned to make 
way for increased production. Likewise, the energy 
security benefits provided by U.S. corn-based ethanol 
may be jeopardized if its process heat is provided by 
increasingly challenged coal sources, if its production 
depends on the increased production of water-inten-
sive irrigated corn, or even if the removal of corn resi-
dues (stalks and leaves) to produce cellulosic ethanol 
result in poorer soil quality and greater nitrate runoff. 
Even the most efficient first-generation ethanol1 
produced from Brazilian sugarcane may be deemed 
unacceptable if fair labor practices are not observed or 
land acquisition abuses persist. 
Recent accounts in both the popular and scientific 
press have produced second thoughts about the 
social and environmental impacts of, in particular, 
large-scale biofuel production. On the environmental 
front, the global agenda is aimed at tackling trends 
of water scarcity, threats to biodiversity, and climate 
change—many of which are related to land use and 
land use change. From a social perspective, poverty 
reduction, land rights, labor rights, and health and 
nutrition top the bill (United Nations 2000, 2002). 
In each of these areas, biofuels are often considered 
as much of a threat as an opportunity, and the policy 
and market mechanisms available to address these 
risks are no less complicated. The potentially negative 
effects of biofuel production just described are gener-
ally not taken into account in market transactions or 
trade mechanisms, in that most environmental and 
social costs are not included in the price commanded 
for these global commodities. Therefore, as society 
continues to place greater value on these external 
costs—such as global warming, social justice, and 
access to clean water—institutions must impose 
instruments that address both the local and global 
impacts of biofuel development. 
At the global level, a significant debate on the 
social and environmental performance of biofuels 
revolves around global trade and domestic and inter-
national trade-distorting policies. As biofuel advo-
cates lobby for greater trade liberalization of ethanol 
and biodiesel to address global energy needs (for 
example, by reducing barriers associated with import 
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tariffs, subsidies, taxes/credits, and blending targets/
quotas), most agree that this will inevitably lead to 
significant increases in global biofuel production, 
particularly in the tropics (Masami, Mitchell, and 
Ward 2007). Thus, many have urged that any move-
ment to further liberalize trade should simultaneously 
incorporate meaningful environmental and social 
safeguards against the potentially negative effects of 
large-scale production.
Further complicating this dialogue are concerns 
from developing nations about the technical barri-
ers of nonproduct-related process and production 
methods (PPMs) associated with sustainability 
criteria. Although, generally speaking, nondiscrimi-
nation against domestic or foreign “like” products 
is a golden rule within World Trade Organization 
(WTO) regulations, distinguishing products based 
on how they are made (PPMs) is taboo within the 
WTO committees. Agreed upon provisions within 
the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, which ulti-
mately created the WTO, aim to ensure that national 
programs and standards do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade. Although national 
governments are taking a closer look at PPMs in 
policy and standards development, agreement around 
which standards to apply remains elusive and the 
application of these new approaches in international 
trade environments remains substantially untested. 
Voluntary certification and labeling schemes, by con-
trast, are considered to be outside of the scope of the 
WTO, so long as governments remain uninvolved. 
For this reason, and in response to the deficien-
cies of national governmental regulation and weak 
transnational institutions, voluntary certifications of 
sustainable biofuels are often identified as a necessary 
component of efforts to safeguard environmental 
and social performance internationally (Kirton and 
Tebilcock 2004).
Private Certification of Sustainable Biofuels
Sustainability standards and certifications are not new 
or unique to biofuels. Over the last three decades, 
the public monopoly on regulation has begun to 
bend to the forces of market mechanisms. In the 
environmental and social domains, in particular, 
governance outside of traditional state-centered 
regulation has proliferated. Private actors take areas 
of governmental intervention into their own hands 
and apply to it instruments that customarily are in 
the private sphere. At times, they even identify and 
take on new issues that have not yet been addressed 
by public intervention. In this process, private actors 
gain the authority to decide, direct, make rules, and 
obtain performance from others (Cashore, Auld, 
and Newsom 2004)—although the legitimacy of 
this authority may vary (Raines 2003). In many 
recent instances, private proposals for addressing 
environmental and social externalities have not been 
limited to one initiative. Rather, rival initiatives have 
emerged, with several stakeholder groups (represent-
ing various social, political, and economic interests) 
organizing in network form to compete over the 
emerging rules of the game. These nongovernmental, 
market-driven forms of governance have appeared in 
diverse areas such as sustainable forestry, green build-
ing design and products, sustainable agriculture and 
fisheries, fair trade, cleaning products, personal health 
care products, electronics, and retail carbon offsets. 
Specific to biofuels, multiple sustainability 
certification initiatives are taking shape and evolving 
at both the fuel and feedstock levels. It is important 
to distinguish between these initiatives, because the 
motivations for their creation and the stakeholder 
pressures shaping their criteria are quite different. 
At the fuel level, sustainable biofuel standards are 
emerging primarily out of the North (United States 
and Europe) with diverse objectives and priorities. 
Most notable are those of the Roundtable on Sustain-
able Biofuels (RSB), an initiative of the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Lausanne, which recently 
unveiled “Version Zero” of their principles and 
criteria for sustainable biofuels. In the United States, 
a similar multistakeholder effort has emerged in an 
attempt to develop a consensus-based Sustainable 
Agriculture Practice Standard (SAPS), which includes 
an annex that specifically addresses biofuels. Although 
the future of this standard is unknown—it has been 
contested by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
among others, and is currently undergoing proce-
dural redefinition under a recent American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) ruling—the standards 
development organization overseeing its development 
continues to defend the draft standard.2 Finally, the 
Sustainable Biodiesel Alliance (SBA), headquartered 
in Austin, Texas, has also developed principles and 
baseline practices for biodiesel sustainability. 
Although a metastandard approach for sustain-
ability criteria for bioenergy feedstocks is gaining 
interest among the RSB and some policymakers 
within the European Union (Gilbertson et al. 2007), 
existing initiatives include, but are not limited to, the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Roundtable 
2 The Leonardo Academy is providing process administration 
to develop a consensus-based national sustainable agriculture 
standard through the ANSI process. however, Scientific 
Certification Systems (SCS) has played a significant role in 
developing the content and criteria of the standard, based on 
its previously established proprietary sustainable agriculture 
profiling efforts. Even though this effort is more broadly 
addressing agricultural products, we include it here because of 
its explicit inclusion of biofuel processors.
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meaningful environmental 
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on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), and Round Table 
on Responsible Soy (RTRS). Established in 1994, the 
FSC is one of the most well-documented certifica-
tions currently in operation. Currently certifying 
about 7 percent of the world’s productive forests, 
the FSC is interested in expanding “its solutions to 
non-timber management objectives, such as climate 
change and biofuels,” and that interest has been an 
official component of its global strategy since 2007. 
In 2004, spearheaded by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF), the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil was established to address the pressures of 
increased palm oil production. Its principles and cri-
teria have been used to certify over 1.3 million tons 
of sustainably produced palm oil, although less than 
15,000 tons have been sold (WWF 2009). Finally, 
although still under development, the Round Table 
on Responsible Soy is currently in its third round of 
public consultation on draft principles and criteria. 
Each of these initiatives has formed in response 
to a new and emerging governance arena in which 
the rules of environmental and social performance 
are shaped by competitive processes of private sector 
stakeholders (such as corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, technical experts, and smallholders), 
and in which individual national governments may 
participate but cannot be seen as materially influenc-
ing outcomes. The following sections briefly discuss 
areas of commonality and difference between the 
major standards and certification efforts of sustain-
able biofuels and biofuel feedstocks. Specifically, the 
sections cover the broad findings from a comparison 
of three emerging biofuel initiatives (RSB, SAPS, and 
SBA) and three feedstock initiatives (FSC, RTRS, 
and RSPO). Even though these efforts are largely in 
their infancy, their growth and influence are expand-
ing rapidly in both policy arenas and markets.
Sustainable Biofuels Initiatives
In the current efforts of the RSB, SAPS, and SBA, 
some of the areas of nearly universal agreement 
that are surfacing can form baseline definitions and 
norms from which privately governed sustainable 
biofuels standards might be assessed. By defini-
tion, all the sustainable biofuels standards examined 
address environmental, social, and economic criteria. 
Environmentally, each standard requires sustain-
able biofuels production to entail lower emissions 
than fossil fuels, to protect high-conservation areas, 
and to not degrade the air, soil, or water. Socially, it 
is generally agreed that sustainable biofuels should 
not be produced under conditions of unfair labor 
practices or those that endanger the health or safety 
of workers. A general consensus between standards 
also points to sustainable biofuels supporting local 
communities and the rights of those living in those 
communities. It is generally agreed that second- and 
third-generation biofuels—that is, those from waste 
oil, residual crops, and nonfood sources of cellulosic 
feedstocks—should be emphasized on both environ-
mental and social bases. Finally, though not explicitly 
stated in each of the standards, it is nearly universally 
agreed that sustainable biofuels are those produced 
efficiently and viably without subsidies or other 
economic incentives. 
Although these broad areas of agreement are 
important to the emergence of legitimate private 
governance of sustainable biofuels, they do not in 
any way suggest equivalency between initiatives. 
Substantial differences exist across criteria categories 
and specific approaches toward compliance. Driven 
in large part by the varying composition of stake-
holders behind each emerging standard, pronounced 
differences exist on the handling of greenhouse gas 
emissions and global warming potential, agrochemi-
cal use, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
local production, and indigenous peoples’ rights. In 
addressing greenhouse gas emissions, both the RSB 
and SBA recognize life cycle assessment approaches to 
GhG emissions associated with growing, processing, 
and transporting biofuels. SAPS, however, approaches 
this criterion quite differently, including only “energy 
inputs” in its calculations of energy efficiency and 
greenhouse gas indices and omitting GhG emis-
sions from indirect land use change, excessive tillage, 
or use of chemicals. Thus the focus of SAPS at the 
biofuel processor level centers on a calculation of the 
net fossil fuel gain of its products. As for GMOs, the 
RSB suggests that they can be used to improve pro-
ductivity and environmental performance. By con-
trast, the SBA advises against their use and complete 
transparency when GMO use is unavoidable. SAPS 
flatly states that “the Producer shall not use geneti-
cally modified organism (GMO) planting materials.” 
The largely domestic orientations of SAPS and the 
SBA tend to reduce the emphases on indigenous 
peoples’ rights, whereas broader development goals 
are clearly a central social focus of the RSB. One 
particularly distinguishing tenet of the SBA initiative 
is localization. It is the opinion of the SBA that, to be 
considered sustainable, biofuel production must be 
local—that is, produced locally to be used locally. By 
contrast, the RSB aims to encourage rural economies 
and indigenous peoples through local ownership and 
employment, thereby promoting energy security and 
uplifting local economies.
Sustainable Biofuels Feedstock Initiatives
The RSPO, FSC, and RTRS are built upon similar 
platforms of specified principles and criteria—that 
is, distinguishing characteristics used to evaluate 
certified products or processes. Advocates of the 
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metastandard approach propose the use of existing 
feedstock sustainability standards as qualification 
mechanisms for biofuel sustainability standards at-
large. Thus achieving a consensus around feedstock 
sustainability criteria is a work in progress. An 
examination of the three primary feedstock certifica-
tion standards included in this analysis suggests that 
substantial consensus exists around the principles 
of labor conditions, land use rights, environmen-
tal impact assessments, and soil and water quality. 
And yet differences certainly remain in these areas, 
particularly on the specific language and the stated 
intent within each standard toward the degree of 
compliance necessary for certification.3 These differ-
ences lead to potentially different environmental or 
social performance outcomes in the implementation 
and enforcement of standards, but at the standard 
development level significant commonality exists 
nevertheless.
Consensus among these standards development 
organizations and their stakeholders has yet to be 
achieved on biodiversity, pesticide and chemical use, 
genetically modified organisms, and areas of high 
conservation value. Although standards are based 
on a consensus within groups, such as for the newly 
developing biofuel standards, the values employed 
by such groups help shape the criteria of competing 
standards. For example, the FSC “strictly prohibits” 
the use of genetically modified organisms, while the 
RTRS has yet to address the topic because of differing 
opinions among organizing committee members. 
In the area of pesticide and chemical use, the World 
health Organization and international agreements, 
including the Rotterdam Convention, make recom-
mendations and set prohibitions on significantly 
detrimental pesticides and chemicals. The RTRS 
and FSC are on board with the recommendations 
prohibiting the use of such substances, whereas the 
RSPO claims that it will “reduce and/or eliminate” 
these materials. Specifically addressed by the FSC and 
RSPO, biological diversity has yet to be mentioned 
by the principles and criteria of the RTRS. 
Market and Policy Implications
The negative implications of developing alternative 
energy systems based on nonsustainable biofuel pro-
duction are substantial. Current Energy Information 
Agency estimates project U.S. biofuel production of 
ethanol alone to more than double by 2022, with 
nearly all of this growth stemming from the tradi-
tional corn grain–based technologies (EIA 2008). 
More striking is the same report’s estimates of future 
U.S. imports of biofuels; 2022 ethanol imports are 
expected to reach about 3 billion gallons, a nearly 
sixfold increase over 2008 levels. Without meaningful 
sustainability protections, expansion of this mag-
nitude, coupled with similar biofuel growth targets 
across the globe, will inevitably place significant 
stress on landscapes, soil and water resources, local 
air quality, global climate change, and the social 
institutions of producing nations coping with labor 
migration, land rights, workers’ rights, and broader 
indicators of social equity. In view of the global scope 
of biofuels, their complex direct and indirect environ-
mental and social implications, and the current global 
financial and economic crisis, it is difficult to envision 
substantial changes to the global governance of sus-
tainability and sustainable development of biofuels. 
Thus, for the foreseeable future, the operationaliza-
tion of sustainable biofuels markets will rely on these 
relatively new, and largely unproven, forms of private 
governance.
The comparisons provided in this article merely 
highlight the vast array of activities surrounding stan-
dards development for sustainable biofuels over the 
last few years and elucidate the competitive nature 
of the rival initiatives seeking to influence the rules 
of the game. Although academic and practitioner 
communities have made great strides toward gaining 
a fuller understanding of the emergence and effects of 
environmental standard setting, of industry self-regu-
lation, and of private governance as both a challenger 
and a counterpart to state authority, very little is 
known about how rival sustainability initiatives (such 
as those seen in the sustainable biofuels arena) evolve 
and affect sustainable outcomes. Interestingly, over 
time and in ways not well understood, many of these 
initiatives appear to have consolidated and converged, 
with a few “winning” systems surviving, implying a 
certain level of environmental or social quality. Yet 
it is unclear whether the vetting processes leading to 
the market success of a particular standard also results 
in sufficient environmental or social performance 
improvements. 
3 All the environmental impact assessments of new production 
and cultivation require some sort of impact assessment and 
management plan. The RSPO, however, includes provi-
sions to require systems to ensure continuous improvement 
of environmental performance. The FSC, within its criteria 
addressing forest plantations, specifies that only plantations 
established before FSC inception in 1994, or those established 
on degraded lands (reforestation) or substituting agricultural 
uses, are acceptable candidates for new cultivation. Similarly, 
on soil quality and degradation, the RSPO specifies only the 
maintenance of soil fertility and yield, whereas the FSC, and 
to a slightly lesser extent the RTRS, places greater emphasis 
on issues of soil structure and biological quality in addition to 
fertility. Finally, it remains to be seen whether language dif-
ferences on the handling of land rights (“fair dealings” versus 
“well-being” versus “consent and compensation”) will result in 
significant differences in practice.
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For biofuels, the differences emerging between 
rival standards and their criteria tend to reflect the 
stakeholders engaged in their development and the 
regional and political landscapes within which they 
are created. Criteria themselves, though often the 
source of much comparison, tend to be a difficult 
dimension by which a standard developer might 
create competitive advantage over rival initiatives. 
Criteria are often transparent, easily replicated, and, 
like knowledge-intensive technical innovations, suffer 
from “weak appropriability regimes” (Van de Ven 
2005: 367). Thus it might be reasonable to conclude 
that competitiveness may be more directly related 
to the composition of stakeholders engaged in the 
initiative and the unique set of resources they bring 
to the table, allowing criteria to shift and evolve as 
standard development organizations jockey for posi-
tion in the evolving sustainable biofuels marketplace. 
This phenomenon has been observed in other areas 
of sustainable product standards and certifications, 
and there is little evidence to suggest that similar 
efforts addressing biofuels will differ significantly. In 
this light, it is important to better understand the 
organizational motivations for joining and leaving 
initiatives, the conditions leading to the prolifera-
tion of additional sustainable biofuels initiatives, the 
determinants of competitive advantage for standard 
developers, and how competition between these ini-
tiatives alter criteria and sustainability outcomes over 
time. Finally, identifying the appropriate roles for 
national governments and transnational organizations 
in shaping the rules, norms, and standards of sustain-
able biofuels will most likely be a necessity as these 
institutions shape carbon management, product, and 
energy policies.
As privately governed standards developers 
approach sustainable biofuels, they face larger, more 
regulated markets, higher environmental and social 
stakes, and (arguably) shorter time horizons to enact 
change. Time will tell whether voluntary market-
driven sustainable biofuel standards are up to the test. 
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Over the last three years, academics and others 
have frequently recognized that expanded produc-
tion of biofuels is one means of reducing the U.S. 
dependence on foreign transportation fuels. however, 
several studies assert that the crop demand for 
biofuel production may prompt conversion of native 
ecosystems to agriculture. This conversion process 
of ecosystems may, in turn, result in carbon releases 
from native biomass and negatively affect the green-
house gas (GhG) profile of biofuels (Righelato and 
Spracklen 2007; Searchinger et al. 2008).
 The California Air Resources Board and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are cur-
rently in the advanced stages of developing rules on 
how to quantify and include GhG emissions when 
comparing the environmental impacts of different 
fuel pathways (California Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 2009). The initiating legislation for the 
rulemaking process are California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard (LCFS) and the federal Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS), which require the GhG emissions 
from biofuels to be assessed on a full life cycle basis, 
including contributions from direct and indirect land 
use change. 
GhG emissions from direct land use change are 
generally considered those associated with the direct 
supply chain of biorefineries (Plevin and Mueller 
2008). For corn ethanol, such emissions include 
those from land converted to a corn crop to meet the 
incremental demand of an ethanol plant. Economics-
based indirect land use change models take into 
account market forces that induce land use change on 
domestic but mostly foreign land that is not part of 
the direct supply chain (Kim, Kim, and Dale 2008). 
For example, one proposition of these modeling 
efforts is that increased ethanol production in the 
United States leads to more widespread planting of 
corn, which reduces the area available for soybean 
production, thereby reducing U.S. soy exports. In 
turn, other countries such as Brazil will adjust their 
agricultural land use and ultimately convert native 
land to meet the soybean shortfall created by U.S. 
biofuel production. 
The quantification of the GhG impact from this 
process is captured by models in a two-stage process: 
(1) the adjustments in land surface area converted to 
crop production in different countries are quanti-
fied for various U.S. biofuel production scenarios 
(for example, the number of new hectares in corn or 
soybeans in each country), followed by (2) an assess-
ment of what types of ecosystems are being converted 
to crop production (for example, rainforest to corn 
or savannah to soybeans). Most datasets used to 
assess the types of ecosystems conversions under way 
for biofuel production are based on remotely sensed 
imagery. however, we are not aware of a sound 
assessment of the accuracy of remote sensing for land 
use changes associated with biofuel production. The 
hypothesis of this study is that the accuracy of these 
global remotely sensed information products is insuf-
ficient for determining land use changes from biofuel 
production. 
The use of remotely sensed imagery for the deter-
mination of land cover is well documented. Since the 
1970s and the launch of the first Landsat satellite by 
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA), this imagery has been classified with 
good success into land cover parcels. The type of 
cover usually indicates the land use. For example, if 
the land cover is pavement, it is safe to assume the 
land use would be human development or urban. 
When compared from year to year, satellite imagery 
can identify changes in land use. If an area is identi-
fied as agriculture one year and human development 
the next, it may be assumed that the area is one of 
urban encroachment. 
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One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2004 Aerial Photograph 
(2 meter resolution, 250,000 pixels)
One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2004 MODIS Land Cover 
(500m resolution, 4 pixels)
Figure 1 Scene 1 in Illinois: satellite imagery with different 
resolutions.
One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2004 Cropland Data Layer 
(30 meter Landsat TM, 1,111 pixels)
One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2000 SPOT-4 Global Land Cover 
(1 km resolution, 1 pixel)
33
Comparison of Spatial Resolutions 
for Different Sensors
The recent introduction of remote sensing datasets 
into the assessment of land use change associated 
with the possible expansion of agriculture to accom-
modate biofuel production seems obvious. Remote 
sensing offers an opportunity to directly image the 
extent of land use change, but the errors associated 
with the classification must be taken into account. 
For example, if 15 percent of forested areas is incor-
rectly identified in year one and 10 percent is incor-
rectly identified in year two, the error range totals 25 
percent. Another common problem with land use 
change is the nature of the occurrence itself. Land 
use change usually occurs in transition areas between 
two land cover types such as forestry and agriculture. 
These transition areas are prone to misclassification 
from a mixed pixel effect. A pixel is the minimum 
area on the ground for which one value associated 
with the intensity of light reflected from the earth’s 
surface is being recorded. If the area within a pixel 
consists of more than one land cover type, it can be 
misclassified, especially from one year to the next. 
These errors may seem minor, but when one is assess-
ing land use change on a regional scale over millions 
of hectares, small percentage errors can indicate large, 
incorrect changes. The higher the number of pixels 
recorded by a sensor for a given surface area, the 
higher is the spatial resolution of the imaging system.
Figure 1 shows a 1-kilometer area in Illinois 
captured with sensors on board different satellites. 
Depending on the spatial resolution of the sensors 
on the satellites, the 1-kilometer area is divided into 
different amounts of pixels. At the top left of Figure 
1 is an aerial photograph of the scene showing agri-
cultural land, water, urban buildings, and roadways. 
Indeed, buildings and roadways make up a significant 
part of the scene. 
At the top right of Figure 1 is the same scene by 
means of the 30-meter resolution Landsat Thematic 
Mapper (TM) sensor used by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) for the NASS Cropland 
Data Layer from 1999 to 2005. The USDA NASS 
Cropland Data Layer classification for 2004 using 
the Landsat TM captures the waterway, grass, forest, 
and urban areas. Currently, USDA NASS is using 
the AWiFS sensor for the Cropland Data Layer with 
a resolution of 56 meters, which is close to that of 
Landsat (AWiFS also has a shorter revisit time of five 
days versus seventeen days for TM, which increases 
accuracy). 
In the lower left corner of Figure 1 is the same 
scene by means of the 2004 Global Landcover Clas-
sification’s 500-meter resolution from the MODIS 
sensor. According to the EPA, its modeling efforts for 
life cycle analyses of the Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dard are relying on MODIS satellite data. The figure 
reveals that the use of MODIS results in significant 
reductions and that one pixel now combines forest, 
crop, and urban areas into one “crop” category. 
In the lower right corner of Figure 1 is the Illinois 
scene with a 1-kilometer resolution from the SPOT-
VEGETATION sensor, which, for example, is used 
for the “New IPCC Tier-1 Global Biomass Carbon 
Map for the Year 2000” (Ruesch and Gibbs 2008). 
By means of this sensor, the complete scene is further 
reduced and characterized as cropland. Figure 2 
provides a similar demonstration for a more homoge-
neous land cover scene in Illinois. The MODIS and 
SPOT sensors combine the mixed land cover in that 
scene into one cropland category. 
For the study described here, we chose the best 
possible sensors to determine the accuracy of model-
ing direct and indirect land use while acknowledging 
the trade-off between resolution and cost (availabil-
ity). Therefore, direct land use change was modeled 
using the higher resolution AWiFS sensor, whereas 
indirect land use change was modeled using MODIS 
because this sensor produces a global land cover 
product. The region chosen for direct land use mod-
eling was the corn supply area for an ethanol plant 
in Illinois; indirect land use change was modeled for 
Illinois and Brazil. 
 The study presented 
here hypothesizes that the 
accuracy of global remotely 
sensed information products 
is insufficient for determin-














One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2004 Aerial Photograph 
(2 meter resolution, 250,000 pixels)
One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2004 MODIS Land Cover 
(500m resolution, 4 pixels)
Figure 2 Scene 2 in Illinois: satellite imagery with different 
resolutions. 
One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2004 Cropland Data Layer 
(30 meter Landsat TM, 1,111 pixels)
One Kilometer Area in Illinois 
2000 SPOT-4 Global Land Cover 
(1 km resolution, 1 pixel)
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Direct Land Use Change 
In a previous study, we assessed land use change in 
a 40-mile circle surrounding an ethanol plant in 
Illinois (Mueller and Copenhaver 2008). For this 
study, we have further analyzed the data because it is 
representative of the accuracies that can be achieved 
in direct land use change assessments. The assessment 
uses the USDA NASS Cropland Data Layers for 
2005, 2006, and 2007 (developed by USDA NASS 
using AWiFS imagery with 56-meter resolution and 
five-day revisit time for agricultural areas) combined 
with the 2001 National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) 
for nonagricultural classifications, which is currently 
the most recent version.1 The overall accuracy of the 
cropland data for Illinois in 2007 is 97.6 percent 
(cropland data include only agricultural classes).2 The 
error range for land use change between two years, 
in this case for Illinois, would approximate 2 × (1 – 
0.976) = 4.8 percent.
however, the accuracies of the 2001 NLCD are 
lower and not consistently assessed. The NLCD has 
not been formally assessed for accuracy on a national 
basis, but overall accuracy assessments have been esti-
mated at 83.9 percent (homer et al. 2007). Further-
more, roadways and field fringes introduce further 
inaccuracies. Therefore, the accuracy assessment of 
our direct land use parcel employed an additional 
vetting routine. 
The data revealed that 39,841 hectares out of the 
601,994 hectares in corn (or 7 percent) during the 
study year 2007 would have been predicted to change 
from nonagricultural use to corn. however, in further 
analysis, we performed additional vetting of the data 
by applying a routine to the masked area that sub-
tracted a 0.3 hectare buffer along the roadways. Sub-
tracting the roadway buffers resulted in a significant 
drop in the nonagricultural categories from a total of 
39,841 hectares to 1,663 hectares, or 0.27 percent 
of predicted nonagricultural land use change. We 
took about fifty test samples with aerial photography 
to confirm that these parcels were indeed roadway 
buffers or field fringes around agricultural land (see 
Figure 3). The characteristics of roadway buffers and 
fringes are such that very minor changes in vegeta-
tion can prompt change in land use classifications. 
Furthermore, an additional 10,771 hectares that, 
in the imagery evaluation routine were classified as 
agricultural to nonagricultural to agricultural conver-
sion (an unlikely scenario) over the three-year period 
2005–2007, were categorized separately. Test samples 
again confirmed that agricultural to nonagricultural 
to agricultural conversions are misclassified. In fact, 
the land remained in continuous corn rotations. 
We conclude that for direct land use change 
assessments for biofuel production in which the 
emphasis is on changes from nonagricultural land to 
agricultural land the lower accuracy of the NLCD 
as well as roadways and field fringes may lead to sig-
nificant overestimations of land use change (39,841 
hectares from nonagricultural use to corn versus 
1,663 hectares). Therefore, the data require addi-
tional vetting for direct land use assessments (Table 
1). Because the additional vetting affected primarily 
(nonagricultural) NLCD classifications, it is clear 
that the vetting process raised the lower accuracy 
associated with the NLCD to cropland data levels (in 
excess of 95 percent).
 Land use change usually 
occurs in transition areas 
between two land cover 
types such as forestry and 
agriculture.
 The region chosen for 
direct land use modeling 
in this study was the corn 
supply area for an ethanol 
plant in Illinois; indirect land 
use change was modeled for 
Illinois and Brazil.
This 2.8-hectare area was classified as woodlands in 2006 and corn in 2007, but it appears to have been in 
agricultural production both years. Trees surrounding the field likely led to the misclassification in 2006.
Figure 3 Field fringe test sample.
1 A new version is expected in 2010. Information on the 
National Land Cover Dataset is available from the website 
of the Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics Consortium 
(MRLC) at http://www.mrlc.gov.




Indirect Land Use Change
NASA offers a global land cover product that was 
developed from the agency’s MODIS sensors on 
board the Terra and Aqua satellites. As pointed out 
earlier, the MODIS remote sensing data have been 
considered for land use change modeling of biofu-
els for regulatory purposes. Therefore, the accuracy 
of land use change predicted with MODIS land 
cover data was selected for further assessment.3 The 
MODIS sensor collects images at 250-meter, 500-
meter, and 1-kilometer resolution pixels over the 
earth’s entire surface on a daily basis. The dataset, 
known as MCD12Q1, is processed at the 500-
meter resolution. The global land cover product was 
developed on an annual basis from 2001 to 2005 by 
combining cloud-free MODIS images throughout 
the year and analyzing these multitemporal datasets 
for land cover based on the reflectance and a detailed 
network of ground truth information. 
The MCD12Q1 actually comes in different land 
cover classification schemes, including one developed 
by the University of Maryland and another that 
breaks agriculture into cereal and broadleaf crops. 
This analysis used the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme (IGBP) land cover types, but 
they were aggregated to facilitate data analysis (see 
Table 2).
An analysis of land cover predicted for Brazil 
for 2001 and 2004 by the MCD12Q1 dataset does 
show a decline in the number of hectares in forest 
and shrubland and an increase in cropland, but it 
also shows a considerable increase in savanna and a 
significant decrease in the mixed/crop class (Table 3). 
These classifications indicate that there is some poten-
tial confusion about the amount of natural vegetation 
being converted into cropland. 
The accuracy associated with these MCD12Q1 
land cover classifications should be taken into con-
sideration when determining the relevance of change 
measured with these datasets. The NASA land cover 
team gathered ground truth points from various 
locations throughout the world and then compared 
those points with the results from the land cover clas-
sification. For the current version of the MCD12Q1, 
version five, there are no published errors; the most 
recent published errors are for version three (Boston 
University 2009). Because it is unlikely that version 
five will have achieved a significant increase in accu-
racy for the purposes of this analysis, the accuracies 
associated with version three will be used. Table 4 
lists the probabilities, in confidence values, that each 
pixel will meet the accuracy of the ground truth used 
to develop the map.4 
 Analyses of land cover 
predicted for Brazil indicate 
that there is some potential 
confusion about the amount 
of natural vegetation being 
converted into cropland.
 We conclude that the 
MODIS datasets are fairly 
inaccurate for predicting 
land use changes from or 
to forested areas in Illinois 
and areas with similar 
ecosystems.
Table 1 Unvetted and Vetted AWiFS (NASS USDA) Crop Data
 2007 crop area in 2006
Land use NASS unvetted hectares NASS vetted hectares
Corn 276,370 275,324
Soybeans 269,417 267,764
Winter wheat 5,848 6,081
Other small grains 299 111
Winter wheat/soybean double cropped 113 45
Alfalfa 2,809 1,238
Other crops 4,537 3,815






Agric. in 2005 to nonagric. to agric. 0 10,771
Field and roadway fringes 0 34,531
Total analyzed 601,994 601,994
a Of the total of these nonagricultural categories, 39,841 of the NASS unvetted hectares were converted to corn and 1,663 of the 
NASS vetted hectares were converted to corn.
3 The MODIS dataset can be downloaded at no charge by the 
general public at ftp://e4ftl01u.ecs.nasa.gov/.
4 The table is reproduced from http://www-modis.bu.edu/
landcover/userguidelc/consistent.htm.
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 The accuracy of remote 
sensing for land use 
analyses generally varies by 
the type of land use and the 
resolution of the sensor.
Table 3 NASA MCD12Q1 Land Cover Classification Dataset, 2001 and 2004 
Land cover 2001 2004 Difference
Forest 393,451,000 382,090,000 –11,361,000
Shrub 5,394,000 2,720,000 –2,674,000
Savanna 272,622,000 312,837,000 40,215,000
Grassland 45,449,000 23,965,000 –21,484,000
Wetland 10,450,000 11,296,000 846,000
Crop 27,869,000 28,110,000 241,000
Urban 3,924,000 3,921,000 –3,000
Mixed/crop 85,737,000 79,866,000 –5,871,000
Barren/snow 705,000 225,000 –480,000
Table 4 Global Confidence Values by Land Cover Class
 
IGBP land cover class
Confidence 
value (percent)
1. Evergreen needleleaf 68.3
2. Evergreen broadleaf 89.3
3. Deciduous needleleaf 66.7
4. Deciduous broadleaf 65.9
5. Mixed forest 65.4
6. Closed shrubland 60.0
7. Open shrubland 75.3
8. Woody savanna 64.0
9. Savanna 67.8
10. Grasslands 70.6
11. Permanent wetlands 52.3
12. Cropland 76.4
14. Cropland/natural vegetation 60.7
15. Snow and ice 87.2
16. Barren 90.0
17. Water n.a.
Average value, all classes 70.7
Area-weighted average 78.3
n.a. = not available.







used for this 
analysis
Water Water
Evergreen needle-leaf forest Forest
Evergreen broad-leaf forest Forest
Deciduous needle-leaf forest Forest









Urban and built-up Urban
Cropland/natural vegetation mosaic Mixed
Permanent snow and ice Other
Barren or sparsely vegetated Other
If a class has a confidence value of 70 percent, 
each location in this class has a 30 percent probability 
of incorrect classification. Anyone assessing changes 
in a class from year to year, then, must take this error 
into account. If the amount of change in the class 
is less than the amount of potential error, there is a 
real chance that the change may be incorrect. For 
example, if a class consists of 1 million hectares in 
2001 and 800,000 hectares in 2004 but its accuracy 
is 70 percent, then that class could be off by up to 
300,000 hectares in 2001 and 240,000 hectares in 
2004, creating a total error of 540,000 hectares. With 
the potential error of 540,000 hectares for a 200,000-
hectare change, it may be difficult to use this change 
with a high level of confidence. 
For this analysis, the potential error for each class 
was applied to the 2001 and 2004 MODIS datasets. 
Specifically, the error was applied to the hectares for 
each individual class and then combined to ensure 
accuracy (see Table 5). These errors, when applied 
to the data, bring into question efforts to calcu-
late change in a number of these classes to or from 
crop. The combined error range for land use change 
in forestland, for example, could total 90 million 
hectares. In Brazil, about 28 million hectares are in 
crops each year. Figure 4 illustrates the scale of these 
values. The combined error range for land use change 
for savanna is even greater—almost seven times as 
many hectares in question (192 million) as land in 
crops (28 million). If the error range far exceeds the 
land use transitions predicted for biofuel production, 
then these datasets are not suited to support sound 
analyses in this field. In fact, the Global Landcover 
Validation report states that the purpose of the 
MCD12Q1 datasets is to assess global land cover and 
that they should not be used to assess interannual 
change (Strahler et al. 2006). 
Finally, we analyzed MODIS imagery for Illinois 
and compared the results with tabular survey data 
compiled by the U.S. Forest Service and the USDA 
NASS. Figure 5 shows that MODIS underestimates 
the surface area of forests by 75 percent, whereas 
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it overestimates the surface area of cropland by 15 
percent. We conclude that the MODIS datasets are 
fairly inaccurate for predicting land use changes from 
or to forested areas in Illinois and areas with similar 
ecosystems (such as other Midwestern states).
Conclusions
The accuracy of remote sensing for land use analy-
ses generally varies by the type of land use and the 
resolution of the sensor. For changes in crop types 
between two years, for example, Landsat or AWiFS 
imagery can achieve a combined error range as low 
as 4.8 percent (Illinois, 2.4 percent error for each 
year), which is sufficiently accurate in combination 
with survey data for many types of cropland statistics 
(including the USDA NASS Cropland Data Layer 
sets). 
For this study, we assessed the accuracy of remote 
sensing for land use changes—both direct and indi-
rect—expected from biofuel production. For direct 
land use change assessments for biofuel production in 
the United States that look at changes from nonagri-
cultural land to agricultural land, the lower accuracy 
of the current National Land Cover Dataset as well as 
roadway and field fringes may lead to significant over-
estimations of land use change. Without additional 
vetting, we would have predicted land use changes 
from nonagricultural land to agricultural land of 
39,841 hectares (or 7 percent of all hectares in corn 
in a given area), whereas the vetted data revealed 
that only 1,663 hectares were probably converted to 
agricultural land (or 0.27 percent of all hectares in 
corn in a given area). Because the additional vetting 
affected primarily (nonagricultural) NLCD classifica-
tions, it can be asserted that the vetting process raised 
the lower accuracy associated with the NLCD to 
cropland data levels (in excess of 95 percent for land 
use change assessments).
Looking at indirect land use changes in Brazil, we 
found that for land use changes such as those that 
might be associated with biofuel production (forest 
to cropland), the combined error range between 
two years was larger than the predicted change. The 
combined error range for forest land use change, for 
example, could total 90 million hectares, whereas 
the total amount of land in crops in Brazil is about 
28 million hectares a year. If the potential error far 
exceeds the predicted change, then using these data-
sets is tenuous at best.
As for indirect land use change in Illinois, for 
forest ecosystems MODIS underestimates the surface 
area by 75 percent. For cropland, MODIS overesti-
mates the surface area by 15 percent. We conclude 
that the MODIS datasets are fairly inaccurate for 
predicting land use changes from or to forested areas 
in Illinois and areas with similar ecosystems (such as 
other Midwestern states).




in error in 2001
Hectares possibly 
in error in 2004
 
Total
Forest 46,910,000 43,070,000 89,980,000
Shrub 1,870,000 980,000 2,850,000
Savanna 89,910,000 102,500,000 192,410,000
Grasslands 13,360,000 7,050,000 20,410,000






























Figure 4 Land use and land use error for Brazil, determined using MODIS.
Comparison of MODIS 









MODIS Global Land Cover 
Illinois 2004
USDA NASS Illinois Crop 
Land Data Layer 2004
Class MODIS Acres for Illinois in 2004 Tabular Data
Forest  1,127,000  4,423,000
Cropland 26,989,000 23,515,000
Figure 5 MODIS imagery for Illinois.
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In summary, direct land use changes for biofuel 
production can be assessed using higher resolution 
imagery from sensors such as Landsat and AWiFS 
(30 meters and 56 meters, respectively) if the data 
are further vetted for field and roadway fringes. 
The accuracy of this process is likely in excess of 95 
percent. An assessment of indirect land use changes 
for biofuel production using imagery from SPOT-
VEGETATION or MODIS produces results with 
high inaccuracies. In fact, the combined error range 
may exceed the predicted land use change between 
important ecosystems such as the conversion of tropi-
cal rainforest to cropland in Brazil. Regulatory agen-
cies such as the California Air Resources Board and 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which 
are in a rulemaking process to incorporate land use 
considerations in biofuel production, must consider 
the limitations of remote sensing for this purpose. 
We recommend that land cover products based on 
high resolution AWiFS imagery for transition regions 
associated with indirect land use change be created. 
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The change in ethanol production in the early 
to mid-2000s illustrated how rapidly the global 
biofuel market can shift, raising concerns about 
human security issues in the process. Global ethanol 
production essentially doubled between 2002 and 
2007, from 23.7 million tons to 44.2 million tons 
(Jun et al. 2009: 2; also see RFA 2009). Until 2005, 
Brazil had been the main biofuel (ethanol) producer, 
using sugarcane as the feedstock. In 2006 the United 
States overtook Brazil in ethanol production, and 
China became the third largest producer in the 
world, although at much lower levels than Brazil 
and the United States (Jun et al. 2009; RFA 2009). 
Global enthusiasm over the potential for biofuels was 
soon dampened, however, by challenges focused on 
whether current production methods and feedstocks 
actually reduce carbon emissions as well as possible 
links to food price rises and volatility of prices for 
food and petroleum. Although efforts are growing to 
develop second- and third-generation biofuels using 
cellulosic feedstocks or algae, ethanol remains the 
dominant biofuel in 2009.
This article briefly examines China’s biofuel policy, 
looking closely at its social dimensions. Energy 
security is an important concern for this growing 
economy, which imported almost half of its petro-
leum needs (350 million tons) in 2006 (Qiu et al. 
2008: 112). Food security, however, is even more of a 
concern, and in response to rising food prices in 2007 
China substantially slowed its biofuel program. 
China’s Ethanol Program
China began its biofuel program in the early 2000s. 
A central goal was to utilize decaying food stocks to 
supply the program. Other goals included promot-
ing energy independence and food security, reducing 
global warming, and increasing rural incomes (IISD 
2008). In 2001 an ethanol refinery was built in 
henan with a 200,000-metric ton capacity (Li and 
Chan-halbrendt 2009). The results seemed promis-
ing. In henan, 1.05 million metric tons of stale 
grains were used to produce 30,000 million tons of 
fuel, thereby saving the government 200 million yuan 
in subsidies (Dong 2007: 6). Building on this success, 
the government erected other facilities and initiated 
a pilot program in 2004 in five provinces: hei-
longjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, henan, and Anhui. These 
provinces were required to use a 10 percent ethanol 
blend (E10) in gasoline.
In 2006 the E10 program was expanded to 
twenty-seven cities in the provinces of Shandong, 
Jiangsu, hebei, and hubei. Maize had been the main 
feedstock, but as internal stocks of grain began to fall 
and world prices of grains (and petroleum) began to 
rise, Chinese officials introduced in 2007 prohibi-
tions on the use of food grains in biofuel production. 
Although maize and some wheat continue to be used 
in production (with maize still about 80 percent of 
the feedstock for ethanol in 2009), the intention is to 
reduce or eliminate them as feedstocks. Meanwhile, 
there is growing interest in biodiesel and nongrain 
foods, such as cassava and sweet sorghum. The first 
plant using cassava opened in Guanxi in 2007. 
Today, ethanol production dominates; the 
output in 2007 was about 1.5 million tons, which 
is comparable to that of the EU (Jun et al. 2009; 
IISD 2008). Much less biodiesel is produced, about 
190,000 metric tons in 2006 (IISD 2008). Ethanol 
is highly regulated and highly subsidized in China. 
In 2006 subsidies of about US$115 million sup-
ported ethanol production via direct output-linked 
payments, tax breaks, and low-interest loans as well 
as the mandatory use of the 10 percent blend in gaso-
line in selected provinces (IISD 2008: 11). Biodiesel 
was initially less interesting to the Chinese because 
the country is a net importer of vegetable oils. As 
technology develops, however, biodiesel is expanding 
and is less regulated.
To reduce the connection between food and fuel 
locally, China began looking to other countries to 
provide feedstocks. A biorefinery on hainan Island 
in southern China is importing cassava from Laos. 
In 2008 China and Nigeria signed an agreement to 
build a cassava-based ethanol plant in Nigeria that 
would produce by-products of fertilizer and flour. 
China’s biofuel agreements continue to expand, 
including other African countries, Brazil, and the 
United States. Officials are especially interested in 
developing cellulosic and algae processes. New agree-
ments will bring in new production technologies 
from other countries, such as the one with Coskata 
in Illinois for a method using agricultural and forest 
waste products, and one with PetroSun for a plant 
using algae. An innovative research project in Lang-
fang near Beijing uses carbon from coal sequestration 
to feed algae that then produce biodiesel (APEC 
2009; Watts 2009; Chambers 2008).
Human Security and China’s Biofuel Program
The human security aspects of biofuel production 
and consumption are related to basic needs (such as 
food and employment), environmental sustainability, 
and people’s agency. A few key human security issues 
associated with China’s biofuel program are examined 
in this section.
Estimates of the number of jobs generated by 
biofuel production vary widely, depending on the 
amount of indirect employment included. Ethanol 
refining uses very little labor; the typical ethanol 
refinery in the United States, for example, employs 
 In 2006 the United States 
overtook Brazil in ethanol 
production, and China 
became the third largest pro-
ducer in the world, although 
at much lower levels than 
Brazil and the United States.
 As internal stocks of 
grain began to fall and 
world prices of grains (and 
petroleum) began to rise, 
Chinese officials introduced 
in 2007 prohibitions on the 
use of food grains in biofuel 
production.
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to other countries to provide 
feedstocks.
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only about thirty-five people (RFA 2009). Detailed 
statistics on biofuel employment creation have not 
been published, but Chinese reports estimate that 
about a thousand jobs are created by each ethanol 
facility. This number is likely to include indirect 
employment (IISD 2008). Most jobs in biofuels stem 
from opportunities related to growing, harvesting, 
and transporting feedstocks, marketing finished fuels, 
and developing and marketing by-products. It is 
likely that entrepreneurial activities will arise from the 
by-products in China, but they have not yet material-
ized to any notable extent. The creation of several 
hundred thousand jobs in this sector is possible, but 
opportunity costs will be associated with trade-offs 
in any land switched from growing food crops to 
growing feedstocks.
Food security is the main human security issue 
for China’s biofuel policy (Xinhua 2009). China’s 
prime agricultural land is divided up into more than 
200 million small farms that are the backbone of the 
rural Chinese economy. Inequality between city and 
countryside is problematic; rural per capita income 
is much lower than urban. Raising the price of grains 
because of the new sources of demand, such as that 
for biofuels, could reduce the rural-urban income 
gap, but a process that resulted in a large transfer 
from urban to rural areas would not be feasible politi-
cally. Moreover, many rural residents are net consum-
ers of grain and would also be hurt by higher prices. 
Rising grain prices already led to the slowing of the 
biofuel program in 2007, and grain commodity infla-
tion continues to be a problem in China.
Instead of raising the incomes of farmers through 
production of grain-based or other feedstocks on 
the best agricultural land, the Chinese are looking 
for alternative locations and technologies for biofuel 
production. For example, officials are experiment-
ing with growing biofuel feedstocks on marginal 
lands in areas such as southwest China, where a large 
jatropha effort is under way, and the northeast, where 
cellulosic feedstocks are being grown. however, these 
marginal lands are not necessarily unused, and some 
are environmentally fragile (Phalan 2009). A full 
cost accounting should include issues of biodiversity, 
water, village income from current land use, and 
other uses of the land by villagers. 
Conclusion
After only a few years, China has pulled back from 
its initial enthusiasm for developing liquid biofu-
els. Food security is an especially critical issue for 
this country, which already has one of the small-
est amounts of agricultural land per capita and has 
dwindling grain reserves and a history of famines. 
higher incomes are quickly translating into growing 
demands for better diets and more milk and meat, 
thereby putting even more pressure on agricultural 
land. Officials have chosen a more gradual approach 
to the current generation of biofuels. Still, China is 
one of the largest ethanol producers globally, and it is 
developing cellulosic and algae processes. Despite its 
pressing energy needs, China is pursuing biofuels just 
enough to hold a strong second-tier position (behind 
the United States and Brazil) in the global biofuel 
scenario.
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